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RESCUING THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL: WHY THE
MODEL OF THE LAWYER AS BOUNTY HUNTER IS NOT
WORKING*
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, Judge Jerome Frank coined the term "private At-
torney General" to recognize the role of private litigation in the en-
forcement of law.' In the intervening years, the "private attorney
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the American Law Institute's Princies of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement
and Recommendations, it should be understood that this article is solely an expression of the
author's personal views and does not purport to represent the position of that document,
except as expressly indicated.
1. Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.
1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) ("Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak,
private Attorney Generals."). The issue in Associated Industries was one of standing in an
administrative law dispute, and no question of private damages was involved. Although
Judge Frank was thus not faced with the lawyer as bounty hunter, he did explicitly recognize
that Congress can confer standing on private persons, not simply to recover compensation
for specific victims, but also "to vindicate the public interest." Id.
By 1970, the theory of the private attorney general had received the apparent en-
dorsement of the Supreme Court. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). Lower court deci-
sions were even more emphatic in their acceptance of the role of private litigation in the
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general" concept has become both a cliche and a crutch, receiving po-
lite lip service from nearly all, but critical analysis from relatively few.2
As most college sophomores know, the private attorney general is
someone who sues "to vindicate the public interest" by representing
collectively those who individually could not afford the costs of litiga-
tion; and, as every law student knows, our society places extensive reli-
ance upon such private attorneys general to enforce the federal
antitrust and securities laws, to challenge corporate self-dealing in de-
rivative actions, and to protect a host of other statutory policies.3
enforcement of statutory and constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Homes Site
Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694-95, (M.D. Ala.), aft'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). See also Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's. Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 666-
70 (1974) (development of private attorney general theory). In 1975, however, the Court
halted this trend abruptly in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc',, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), ruling that the attorneys' fees of a successful plaintiff could only be shifted to the
defendant for payment if a statute specifically authorized such an award or certain other
special exceptions (i.e., "bad faith") applied.
The concept of the private attorney general should not be confused with this nar-
rower issue of fee-shifting. In essence, the premise of the private attorney general is that
announced by Judge Frank: private litigation can produce public good by enforcing statu-
tory and other important policies. This policy premise, of course, depends on some method
of financing the private attorney general, but a number exist: (1) the "common fund" or
"substantial benefit" basis for fee awards, (2) statutory fee shifting, (3) public interest law
firms supported by membership or philanthropic donations, and (4) contingent fee arrange-
ments. The focus of this article will be on the perverse incentives that can and do arise to
confound Judge Frank's confidence in private enforcement, once the lawyer becomes an
entrepreneur.
2. Economists have recently begun to examine seriously the institution of private en-
forcement of law. Among the best known efforts are: K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTI-
TRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); Landes & Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1975); Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement
of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970). See also
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics o/Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980).
Although incisive, these theoretical efforts generally have given little attention to the institu-
tional context in which private litigation arises and the often complex incentive structure
facing the private enforcer. For efforts which have begun to take account of these factors,
see Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEO. L.J. 1053 (1980); Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
A fundamental premise of this article is that more intellectual bridge-building must
occur between those working on the purely theoretical level and those familiar with the
institutional context, if theoretical critiques are to have useful applications.
3. Among the major federal statutes that authorize an award of attorneys' fees to
finance private attorneys general are: (1) the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981); (2)
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); (3) the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); (4) the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1981);
(5) the patent laws, 35 U.S.C § 285 (1976) (award authorized in "exceptional cases"); (6) the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976);
(7) the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); and (8) much recent
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Of course, Judge Frank did not discover the infant private attor-
ney general adrift in the bulirushes; the key institutions of the class
action and the contingent fee already were well established,4 and the
very archetype of such litigation - the private antitrust treble damages
action - dates back to the Progressive Era.5 Nevertheless, his felici-
tous phrase conferred an intellectual legitimacy on practices that other-
wise were scorned by the established bar as champerty and
maintenance.6 Today, as recent decisions on the award of attorneys'
fees have clearly shown, courts have come to accept "the view of the
environmental legislation, e.g., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976);
the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). The common law has
long authorized an award of attorneys' fees out of any common fund that the attorneys'
efforts generated. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533-37 (1882); Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939).
The Congress' continued reliance on private enforcement is best shown by its re-
sponse to Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Shortly after
Alyeska, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to authorize fee shifting in civil rights cases.
See Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). Similarly, a host of recent environmental
statutes provide for fee shifting. See, e.g., § 307 (f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0
(Supp. V 198 1) (authorizing fee shifting whenever the court "determines that such an award
is appropriate"). This standard has been interpreted to authorize a fee award to plaintiffs
even if they are not the substantially prevailing party. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d
33 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
4. Although the rules governing the class action were substantially liberalized in 1966
when Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended, the class action has
been a recognized legal form in American courts since the mid-19th century. See Beaty v.
Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 566 (1829); see also Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1319 (1976). After early judicial hostility, the contingent fee was also ac-
cepted by American courts by the end of the 19th century, and by 1908, the American Bar
Association had followed suit. See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee
Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 475 (1981).
5. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981), which authorizes a
treble damages remedy for private litigants, is the successor to § 7 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1981), which was first passed in 1890. Apparently, the first successful
private treble damages action was W.W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
6. The debate over the propriety of the lawyer as entrepreneur continues today, as
much of the bar still views the contingent fee contract as an impermissible investment by the
attorney in his client's action. See Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Chain-
perty and Class Actions, 36 BUSINESS LAWYER 1667, 1669-70 (1981). Champerty, of course,
is a prohibited arrangement under which a nonparty subsidizes the costs of a litigation in
return for a portion of the proceeds. From this same perspective, the private antitrust class
action can be (and has been) described as "legalized blackmail." See Handler, The Shift
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty- Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1,,9 (1971). To some within the defense bar, private
enforcement litigation appears uniformly frivolous and extortionate in character. For a rep-
resentative example, see Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Deriva-
tive Suits: A Viewfrom the Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 332-33 (1982). Although such an
assessment betrays its author's bias, the relevant point here is that the private attorney gen-
eral model has only an incomplete and sometimes tenuous acceptance within many seg-
ments of the bar and judiciary.
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lawyer as a calculating entrepreneur regulated by calculating judges."7
Much can hang on the choice of words, and the phrase "private
attorney general" is as value-loaded in an affirmative sense as the term
"bounty hunter" is in a negative one. Both terms, however, represent
only different sides of the same legal coin. Once the perjorative termi-
nology is stripped away, the critical public policy issue is exposed: to
what extent can we sensibly rely on private litigation as a mechanism of
law enforcement? This is a broad question, one that subsumes the con-
siderably narrower, but more frequently debated, issues of the appro-
priate standard for determining attorney fee awards and the
desirability of the class action as an enforcement device. This question
is best approached by measuring the distance between the basic policy
premises that underlie the private attorney general and the current real-
ity that it has produced:
The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses
that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation
for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence, principally by
multiplying the total resources committed to the detection and prosecu-
tion of the prohibited behavior. For example, the Supreme Court re-
lied upon precisely the perception that "private enforcement ...
provides a necessary supplement" to public law enforcement when it
first decided to recognize implied private causes of action under the
federal securities laws.8 Yet more recent Supreme Court decisions cur-
tailing those Same implied causes of action have emphasized the dan-
gers latent in class action litigation brought by the bounty hunter, who,
in effect, lacks an actual client to constrain him.9 Lower federal judges
have been even more explicit in their view that the legal system is being
7. Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 481 (referring to the cases discussed infra notes 57-60).
8. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). The Court noted that the SEC
examined over 2,000 proxy statements a year, a volume which precluded an independent
examination of each statement. Based in large part on this observation, it concluded that a
private cause of action should be implied in favor of injured investors because private en-
forcement was necessary "to make effective the congressional purpose." Id at 443. In es-
sence, the Court was assuming that private enforcement would multiply the resources
committed to preventing securites fraud.
9. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Rehnquist, states bluntly (and without citing any supporting evi-
dence): "There has been widespread recognition that litigation under rule lOb-5 presents a
danger of vexatiousness different in degree and kind from that which accompanies litigation
in general. ... Id. at 739. In particular, Justice Rehnquist objected to the ability litiga-
tion under Rule lOb-5 gave "a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem incre-
ment of the settlement value .. " Id. at 241. This language seems clearly directed at the
lawyer as bounty hunter. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (further
restricting lOb-5 actions by requiring scienter).
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exploited, rather than aided, by such attorneys,' 0 and a significant anti-
plaintiff tilt appears evident in recent decisions on standing," attor-
neys' fees,12 and class certification. t3
10. Recent decisions restricting attorneys' fees and tightening class certification and
standing requirements are examined infra notes 12, 13, and 60. The shift in judicial attitude,
however, is also conveyed in less formal statements. The following quotation is from a brief
talk recently given by a Federal Circuit Judge (and former law professor) at a symposium
for law professors, which the author attended in late 1982: "During the One Hundred
Year's War, Europe was nearly brought to its knees by roving bands of mercenaries who
pillaged and robbed and left a barren landscape in their wake. The modern equivalent of
these mercenaries is the plaintiff's attorney in antitrust class actions." Granting that the
judge was intending to be provocative, one still must recognize that he is commenting on a
reality that he has encountered and by which he has been dismayed.
11. In both the fields of securities and antitrust law, the Supreme Court imposed signifi-
cant limitations during the mid-1970's on the standing of a private plaintiff to sue on a
statutory federal cause of action. Compare Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)
(indirect purchaser denied standing under antitrust laws) with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (shareholder who neither purchased nor sold securities
denied standing to assert violation of Rule lOb-5). Concomitantly, other decisions by the
Court denied standing to private plaintiffs to assert implied causes of action. See Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (refusing to recognize an implied cause of action based on a crimi-
nal statute prohibiting corporations from making contributions in Presidential elections). It
is not the purpose of this article to analyze or critique these decisions, but they do suggest a
common pattern.
12. Some recent decisions have been severely critical of the plaintiffs' bar as a whole.
See In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1381-82, 1388-89 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (court slashed requested fees by two thirds). Other decisions have focused on the
expenditure of excessive time, the unnecessary use of senior personnel, or the absence of
minimally adequate time records. See Barnett v. Pritzker, .73 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Blank v. Talley Industries, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Penn Central
Securities Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 907, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 560 F.2d
1138 (3d Cir. 1977).
As a result of these perceived abuses, a host of recent Courts of Appeals decisions
have begun to tighten the evidentiary and procedural requirements for the determination of
fee awards. These decisions have specified relatively precise standards for the determination
of the attorney's normal hourly rate and have restricted the evidence admissible to establish
that rate. Revealingly, the District of Columbia Circuit - traditionally, a "liberal" circuit
and one favorably disposed toward the private attorney general - has lead the way in this
regard. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891-94 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Donnell v. United
States, 682 F.2d 240, 251-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nat. Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec. of
Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Environmental Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 672
F.2d 42, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For similar results in other
circuits, see Jorstad v. I.D.S., 643 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1981); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 767-69 (7th Cir. 1982); Northcross v. Board of Ed., 611 F.2d 624, 638-39
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). These cases are considered in more detail
infra note 60.
13. On the issue of class certification, the trend is again adverse to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (denying class
certification); Gen. Tele. Co. of Southwest v. Falcone, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (same).
At the lower federal court level, a recent trend is to deny certification on the grounds
of the unmanageability of the action. See e.g., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d
59 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); In re Transit Company Tire
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This reversal in judicial attitude cannot be explained simply as the
transition from the liberal Warren Court to the conservative Burger
Court. The hard truth is that the private attorney general as a legal
institution has not lived up to its early promise. This observation alone
should not be surprising, because few things in life work as well in
practice as in theory. Thus, the more important assertion, which will
be the central focus of this article, is this: the reasonsfor this shortfall
between the promise and the performance of the private attorney general
are entirely predictable and almost inevitable once we examine the incen-
tive structure that current law presents to the private enforcer. Similarly
and more optimistically, these problems are also substantially remedia-
ble if we revise that incentive structure.
In theory, the private attorney general is induced by the profit mo-
tive to seek out cases that otherwise might go undetected. Economists
have even worried that the net result might be overenforcement and
excess deterrence.' Yet the available empirical evidence does not pro-
vide much support for the thesis that the private attorney general sig-
Antitrust Litigation, 67 F.R.D. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1975). But see In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (certifying class despite manageability
problems); In re South Central States Bakery Products Antitrust Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 407,
423-24 (M.D. La. 1980)(same). Undoubtedly, a lively debate is possible on the merits of this
issue, but in overview the idea that a proposed action can be too large and too complex to
permit its adjudication in the federal courts must be recognized as a significant retreat from
the liberal optimism of the private attorney general concept.
Similarly, much recent litigation has arisen concerning the adequacy of the class
representative and his counsel. Defendants now attack successfully the skill, experience, and
integrity of the plaintiff's attorney on the theory that the court must examine the credentials
of the plaintiff's attorney before it permits the action to proceed as a class or a derivative
action under Rules 23 or 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Block &
Warren, New Battles in the 'Class Struggle'- the Federal Courts Reexamine the Securities
Class Action, 34 BUSINESS LAWYER 455 (1979) (defendant's view) with Susman, Prosecuting
the Antitrust Class Action, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1513 (1980) (plaintiffs view). See also La-
timer, Damages, Settlements and Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1553 (1980). This article does not attempt to address the specifics of these issues; rather,
the immediate point is that the willingness of federal courts to hear the collateral issue of the
adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel suggests a judicial skepticism about the functioning of the
private attorney general.
14. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2. The basic problem with private enforcement in
their view stems from the fact that the optimum penalty must exceed the social loss caused
by the prohibited behavior in order to compensate for a probability of apprehension, which
is always less than 100%. Thus, if the probability of detection were 50% it would take a $200
fine to deter a $100 crime (in terms of expected benefit to the offender). Increasing the
penalty to offset the margin by which the probability of detection falls below 100% produces,
they argue, two inconsistent effects: (1) it achieves deterrence, but (2) it attracts additional
bounty hunters, because increasing the potential reward is a powerful signal to the market.
This latter consequence is a negative one in their view because at the same moment that
adequate deterrence is achieved, additional private enforcers are induced to enter the field,
lured in by the increased penalty. In short, equilibrium is destroyed, because the very act of
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nificantly supplements public law enforcement by increasing the
probability of detection. 5 Although this evidence is incomplete and
increasing the penalty to an adequate level attracts excess private enforcers and leads to
overenforcement. The result is excess social investment in law enforcement.
The counter-arguments to this essentially static model are numerous. The most ob-
vious objection is that the size of the penalty to the law violator need not equal the bounty to
the bounty hunter; rather, the latter amount (i.e., the fee award) can be regulated by the
court to achieve optimal deterrence. Of course, existing law intuitively does this: the fee
award seldom exceeds 25% of the recovery in a class action and the contingency bonus can
explicitly consider the need for encouraging private enforcement. Equally important, the
Landes/Posner analysis ignores the problems of search costs, risk aversion, and free riders,
problems which exist under current law and on which this article focuses. See infra notes
16-44 and accompanying text.
15. Relatively little empirical work on private enforcement merits careful scrutiny.
Probably the leading recent study of the class action is by Benjamin DuVal, a research
scholar at the American Bar Foundation. See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust En-
forcement Device.- The Chicago Experience (Part I), 1976 A.B. Found. RES. J. 1273. In this
study of private antitrust litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, DuVal found "a strik-
ing correlation between plaintiffs' success and the existence of governmental proceeding."
Id. at 1282. More specifically, he found that (1) plaintiffs always obtained some settlement
if there was a parallel governmental proceeding, (2) large settlements were in all cases pre-
ceded by a governmental proceeding, and (3) in the absence of a governmental proceeding,
"private class actions have rarely met with success . I..." Id. Of even greater relevance to
the issue of whether private litigation expands the scope of law enforcement, DuVal re-
ported that private antitrust class actions seldom undertook to prove difficult or complex
legal theories, but rather tended to concetrate on simple per se violations (i.e., price fixing).
Id. at 1274-77. He concluded:
Clearly, then, the availability of large fees has not broadened the scope of antitrust
enforcement measured in terms of the kinds of legal theories advanced ....
[P]laintiff's attorneys have not displayed an increased willingness when suing on behalf
of the class to undertake the difficulties involved in proceeding in the absence ofper se
violation. Rather, they appear to have been relatively less willing to undertake the
greater difficulties of challenging practices that fall outside the scope of existing per se
rules in class actions than in nonclass cases.
Id. at 1275-77. A detailed individual case study has reached broadly similar conclusions.
See Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, 1976 A.B. FOUND. RES. J. 273. Professor Wolf-
ram also noted both a prevalence of "tag-along actions," and a suspicious tendency for
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to be based on easily manipulated "purely administrative matters."
He concluded both that only limited judicial control existed over the settlement process and
that it was "doubtful in the extreme" that private enforcement was performing adequately
within the limited context that he studied. Id. at 361-63.
In this article's terminology, the failure of the private attorney general to undertake
difficult or novel cases not earlier initiated by the government can be explained in terms of
the combined effects of (1) the disparity in search costs and the failure of current legal rules
to offer a higher expected return for actions initiated by the private enforcer, (2) a high level
of risk aversion, given the substantial investment the private attorney must make, and (3) the
"free rider" problem under which late-appearing plaintiffs' attorneys can intervene and seek
a share of the action initiated by the original plaintiffs' attorney. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 16-44.
Within some areas of securities law enforcement, much of this same pattern is dis-
cernible. Professor Michael Dooley has studied private actions involving allegations of in-
sider trading and found no instance in which a successful private action was not preceded by
an SEC action. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
exceptions no doubt exist to any generalization, a recurring pattern is
evident under which the private attorney general simply piggybacks on
the efforts of public agencies - such as the SEC, the FTC, and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - in order to reap the
gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agencies. 16 As a
16 & 16 n.82 (1980). Once again, the private enforcer appears to be piggybacking on the
efforts of the public enforcer, because the expected benefits from originating new actions do
not exceed those available from piggyback actions where the risk and uncertainty are less.
With respect to derivative actions and securities class actions, more positive evidence
exists as to the efficacy of private enforcement, but firm conclusions are not possible given
the lack of reliable data about the adequacy of settlements. Professor Thomas Jones has
reported that 75% of such actions appeared to result in some measure of relief for sharehold-
ers (although only one percent of this total was represented by litigated judgments in favor
of plaintiffs). See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Deriva-
tive and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 BOSTON U.L. REV. 542, 567 (1980). A closer review of this
data, however, shows that many of the most successful actions identified by him (e.g., the
Mattel, Gulf Oil, United Brands, and IT&T settlements) involved matters of public record
(and indeed notoriety) growing out of earlier SEC investigations into illegal foreign pay-
ments and securities fraud. Id. at 547-56. In still other cases, settlements appear to have
produced little monetary recovery or other relief on which a definite value could be placed.
Id. at 556-63.
16. Cases are legion in which private antitrust class actions have followed a prior gov-
ernmental prosecution or indictment. Typically, these cases are consolidated in the district
court where the grand jury was located in order to facilitate ease of access to the materials
discovered by the grand jury during its prior investigation. Indeed, these "tag-along" pri-
vate actions are so predictable that the Rules of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litiga-
tion expressly provide for the re-assignment of such cases to the district in which the original
action was brought. See Rules 9 and 10, R.J.P.M.L., 65 F.R.D. 253, 259-60 (1975). For
representative examples in which the court's opinion clearly reveals that the private actions
rode on the coattails of a prior governmental proceeding, see In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 727, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (more than 50 private treble damage suits
followed criminal action alleging price fixing); In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 73
F.R.D. 322, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 669 F.2d 228, 232-33
(5th Cir. 1982) (33 individual or class suits filed against defendants following civil suit by
Antitrust Division); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 494, 495 (D.D.C.
1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1981)
("Shortly after the return of the federal indictment, private antitrust actions against
Cuisinarts and its retailers commenced to flood the federal courts"); In re Protection Devices
and Equipment and Central Station Protection Service Antitrust Cases, 295 F. Supp. 39
(J.M.J.D.L. 1968) (80 different private cases filed in seven different districts following civil
action by United States); In re Plumbing Ficture Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33, 33 (J.P.M.D.L.
1968) (39 actions consolidated in district court where prior indictments were returned); In re
Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,585 at 73,200 x (over 30
private class actions commenced following indictment of defendants); In re Cement and
Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 437 F. Supp. 750, 751 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (19 actions follow
civil action brought by Arizona Attorney General after year-long investigation conducted by
him).
In other instances, private actions have piggybacked on an earlier but inconclusive
investigation by a governmental agency. The Fine Paper litigation discussed in this article is
such a case, as the Federal Trade Commission began its investigation of the industry in
1977, but ultimately decided to take no action. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation,
68 F.2d 810, 816 (3d Cir. 1982). In other cases, the government sued but was unable to
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result, the private attorney general does not seem to broaden the scope
of law enforcement, but rather only intensifies the penalty. Typically,
the sequence begins with an SEC injunctive action or an antitrust in-
dictment, which within a brief period elicits a horde of plaintiffs' attor-
neys - sometimes numbering well over 100 - all seeking to
participate in a private class action, the allegations of which largely
parallel and sometimes literally parrot those set forth in the agency's
complaint. 7 Although cases can be found in which private enforce-
ment did precede public enforcement, these cases are rare and gener-
ally involve special factors, such as a particularly sizable plaintiff
capable of affording the costs of litigation."S
obtain relief, while the private plaintiffs were ultimately successful. See, e.g., In re Plywood
Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 636 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing refusal of Ninth Cir-
cuit to uphold FTC administrative law judge), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 232 (1982). For a
discussion of the successful settlement of this private action (for $165 million), see "Plywood
Makers Agree to Settle Antitrust Suit," Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
The speed with which the private bar can mobilize its resources in order to piggy-
back on a governmental action also deserves special comment. In one recent case, the court
noted that "within twenty-four hours after the filing of the indictment, numerous civil suits
were brought" and a plaintiffs' executive committee was in the process of formation. See
United States v. Roblin Industries, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,644 at 77,486
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 21, 1980).
17. To give some recent examples:
(1) in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.
Tex. 1978), 48 law firms submitted fee petitions for a total of $48,216,309. See Lempert,
"Antitrust Lawyer Hopes Fee Will Confirm Vision," Legal Times, May 17, 1982 at 1, col. 1;
(2) in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 415 F. Supp. 384 (J.P.M.D.L.
1976), 57 plaintiffs' law firms eventually sought fee awards;
(3) in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. March 3, 1983),
33 law private firms plus the attorneys general of eight states submitted fee petitions on
behalf of 160 individual attorneys requesting fees totalling over $20,000,000. See Bruck,
"Harold Kohn Against the World," The American Lawyer, January, 1982, at 28-32;
(4) in In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979),
20 law firms (consisting of 85 attorneys) submitted fee petitions totalling $1,287,500. Id. at
1380, 1384. Twenty-two attorneys in Armored Car claimed hourly rates in excess of $125
per hour. Id. at 1385. For other recent cases, see In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation,
433 F. Supp. 1122 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re Equity Funding Corp of America Securities
Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1378 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
18. In at least two recent cases, the government's action appears to have been based on
earlier detective work undertaken by a private enforcer. The decision in United States v.
United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978), is essentially the result of efforts by a large
private plaintiff (Texas Gypsum), which, beginning in 1961, sought to convince governmen-
tal agencies to undertake an investigation into price-fixing in the gypsum wallboard indus-
try. Meeting with no success, it filed its own treble damage action in 1962, and obtained a
settlement. A governmental investigation begun in 1966 eventually led to a grand jury in-
quiry in 1971 and an indictment in 1973. See United States v. United States Gypsum Com-
pany, 383 F. Supp. 462, 465-68 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Similarly, private plaintiffs initiated the
prosecution of price-fixing in the gas meter industry. A civil action was filed by private
plaintiffs in 1978, and eight months later an indictment followed. See In re Gas Meters
Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 956, 957 (E.D.Pa. 1980). For other class actions alleging
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This phenomenon of "free riding" by the private plaintiff on gov-
ernmental enforcement efforts is by no means without social utility:
First, it does escalate the penalty structure above the modest fine sched-
ules that are authorized by law (and nullified by inflation). Absent
these private actions, the monetary penalties for antitrust and securities
fraud plainly would be insufficient to deter.'9 Second, it often may be
more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection (an area
where they have the comparative advantage because of their superior
investigative resources) and leave the actual litigation of the case to
private enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in litigation
price-fixing that have no visible connection with a prior governmental proceeding, see In re
Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litigation, 424 F. Supp. 504 (J.P.M.D.L.
1976); In re Alcoholic Beverages Litigation, 95 F.R.D. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Beef In-
dustry Antitrust Litigation, 419 F. Supp. 720 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
Nonetheless, it is highly questionable whether any of these cases truly represent an
instance of enforcement by a "private attorney general" as that term is used in this article -
an attorney who is largely unconstrained by any client. In the Gypsum litigation, the facts
reduce in essence to the simple truth that a large firm simply brought suit against others in
its industry who it had reason to believe were engaged in price-fixing; in Gas Meters, the
principal plaintiffs were large electric utilities, who were clearly capable of monitoring their
own attorneys. The Bristol Bay and Alcoholic Beverages cases do involve small plaintiffs,
but they essentially concern local disputes of which the plaintiffs presumably were fully
informed. In addition, the individual plaintiffs already were organized into a larger um-
brella organization (a fisherman's cooperative in the Bristol Bay case) which made collective
action simpler and thus solved the inherent "free rider" problem. In short, none of these
cases involve a private attorney, unaided by a substantial client having knowledge of the
relevant industry or a deep pocket, who investigated and successfully prosecuted an antitrust
class action involving price-fixing or similar covert activities without relying on an earlier
governmental proceeding or investigation. Such a case remains remarkably hard to find.
19. The disparity is striking between the modest financial penalty that the criminal law
can exact and the much greater damages that private actions regularly produce. The max-
imum fines under the antitrust law (authorized in the case of a criminal conviction) are
$1,000,000 in the case of a corporation and $100,000 in the case of an individual. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976). Yet, in Corrugated Container, 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex 1978), the corporate de-
fendants have agreed to pay nearly $500 million and the requested fee award is $47 million.
See Mieher, "Group of Antitrust Lawyers Riles Clients, Opponents by Seeking $50 Million
in Fees," Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1982, at 31, col. 4. The history of antitrust en-
forcement shows that only modest penalties have been imposed. See K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, supra note 2, at 54-62. In only 27% of the cases from 1967 to 1970 did the Depart-
ment of Justice even seek the modest maximum fine then authorized by law. Id. at 61.
Between 1965 and 1969, the average fine in antitrust cases was only $116,622. Posner, .4
Statistical Study of/Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 392 (1970).
This pattern is not unique to the antitrust context. As I have argued elsewhere, low
penalties tend to characterize public enforcement of law, because (1) courts show great re-
luctance to impose penalties that achieve little compensatory purpose, (2) the public enforcer
is interested more in the political value of a victory (while the profit-motivated private en-
forcer cares almost exclusively about the damages), and (3) public enforcers can be lobbied
politically to settle for a modest penalty if a more severe one would arguably force lay-offs,
plant closings, or corporate insolvency. See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn," No Body to Kick." An
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
405-12, 434-48 (1981).
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tactics.20 In practice, this pattern of public agency reliance on private
actions has become standard in SEC enforcement litigation, and it also
has characterized some recent antitrust prosecutions. 2' Thus, although
some have characterized such "tag along" private enforcement actions
as "parasitic," 22 it may be more accurate to describe the relationship
between public and private enforcer as symbiotic. Nonetheless, some
disturbing evidence dealing with antitrust class actions suggests that the
deterrent threat of the private attorney general has been blunted. This
evidence seems to show that private litigated judgments are few, cheap
20. For example, if there are economies of scale associated with the investigation or
detection of a given offense, public enforcement may be more efficient. In addition, the
social investment in investigative institutions, such as the FBI or the SEC, is already a sunk
cost. Thus, the phenomenon noted by Professor Dooley, supra note 15, that insider trading
cases always begin with a governmental action, seems best understood in this light: econo-
mies of scale exist in the sense that the New York Stock Exchange is uniquely positioned to
detect unusual trading activity, and it will typically notify the SEC, which can commence an
investigation and issue subpoenas to gather relevant evidence at a lower cost than private
enforcers.
But it does not follow that the government is the best or cheapest prosecutor once the
initial evidence is gathered. Private attorneys, motivated by profit, may work harder or be
more experienced than the public attorney within a large bureaucracy. Indeed, private en-
forcers typically are alumni of some public enforcement agency (e.g., the SEC, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, or a U.S. Attorneys' Office).
21. For example, in the Corrugated Container litigation, the government indicted the
corporate defendants, who were acquitted by a jury in 1979. But in the one subsequent civil
case that came to trial, the private plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict against the Mead Corpo-
ration for an estimated $700 million in damages plus attorneys' fees. See Lempert, supra
note 17, at 10, col. 1. Similarly, in Fine Paper, there was a prior governmental investigation,
but no action was taken based upon it. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d
810, 816 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting "ultimately inconclusive investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission and United States Department of Justice" as the triggering cause of the private
litigation). In the Plywood case, discussed supra note 16, the government initiated the action
but was unable to secure relief, yet private plaintiffs eventually secured a $165 million settle-
ment. Thus, it is oversimple to assume that the tendency for the government to initiate the
action renders private plaintiffs irrelevant. Indeed, the normal practice used by the Enforce-
ment Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to initiate the complaint and
then settle with the defendants in a relatively painless consent decree under which the de-
fendants agree not to violate the securities laws in the future, but acknowledge no wrongdo-
ing or liability in the instant case. These "go-and-sin-no-more" settlements have little
inherent deterrent value, but they signal to the plaintifi's bar that an attractive case is avail-
able. Moreover, the defendant seldom dares to litigate with the agency, because a judgment
(as opposed to a consent order) would have res judicata effect in the subsequent damages
actions. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Thus, the relationship
between public and private enforcers serves the public enforcers' interest as well. Whether
this relationship between public and private enforcers is optimal can be debated, but to the
extent that one believes that government agencies either (1) are sufficiently constrained by
budgetary limitations as to be unable to hire an adequate number of enforcement attorneys,
or (2) have difficulty in retaining highly skilled attorneys in litigating positions, then,
notwithstanding its follow-the-leader posture, the efforts of the private bar cannot be dis-
missed as useless.
22. Dooley, supra note 15, at 16.
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settlements are common, and the typical settlement recovery is below
even the level of the compensatory damages alleged by the plaintiffs
(despite the existence of a treble damages penalty).23 Such evidence is
consistent with a diagnosis that the private enforcer tends to accept in-
adequate settlements.
The problem then is two-fold: First, when the private attorney
general becomes a "free rider," society loses the promise that Judge
Frank's theory held out: that private resources would supplement pub-
lic efforts in the detection of law violations by bringing actions that
otherwise would not have been initiated. Second, the ability of private
law enforcement to create a credible penalty structure is undercut if the
private watchdog can be bought off by tossing him the juicy bone of a
higher-than-ordinary fee award in return for his acceptance of an inad-
equate settlement.
To say this is not to challenge the basic theory of private law en-
foroement, which still seems sound on grounds of efficiency, fairness,
and the need for the legal system to maintain a stable system of signals.
Private enforcement is potentially more "efficient," because only the
successful attorney is compensated and because private enforcement
may be able to mobilize and reallocate its resources more quickly than
the public enforcer, who is confined within a bureaucratic setting.
24
23. See DuVal, supra note 15, at 1327, for the following conclusion: "Judged by results,
the class action has proved a rather feeble engine of antitrust enforcement." DuVal's find-
ings from his empirical study of private antitrust litigation in the Northern District of Illinois
include the following salient points:
(1) In his sample, no litigated judgment was entered in favor of a class, even
though defendants often won, and a significant percentage were settled with the named
plaintiff for a "relatively small amount." Id.
(2) "The available data suggest that for the most part. . . [in the cases surveyed]
defendants have been required to pay out an amount substantially less than the damages
allegedly suffered by the class or classes injured" Id. at 1329.
(3) "[W]hile the results in class actions . . . [in this study] have been far from
impressive, the availability of the class action remedy has enhanced private enforcement
efforts to a limited extent." Id. at 1332.
This data must be interpreted cautiously. Despite this "warts and all" portrait of the
private attorney general, the real issue is, as always, "what are the alternatives?" DuVal's
finding, that there was at least some positive impact (even if an insufficient one to generate
adequate deterrence) should remind us that it is premature to abandon private enforcement
unless there is a superior alternative at hand which will be actually implemented.
24. The legislative history of the Fee Awards Act shows that Congress believed that
private enforcement would normally be cheaper than public enforcement and that the pri-
vate attorney general was thus a means of saving taxpayer funds by "limiting the growth of
the enforcement bureaucracy." See Senate Report No. 94-1011, 94th Congress, 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911 (June 29, 1976). See also
Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 832 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1982). In the strict economic sense, private
enforcement cannot be described as more efficient simply because the unsuccessful private
attorney is not compensated. Although he receives no payment, a cost is still imposed on
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Private enforcement also is potentially "fairer" because the private
plaintiff does not have the same built-in advantage as the public prose-
cutor or regulatory agency, to whom courts have a tendency to defer.
Nor may the private plaintiff stretch or change the rules to fit the needs
of its case (as public agencies have been known to do).25
Equally important, private enforcement also performs an impor-
tant failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly de-
pendent on the current attitudes of public enforcers or the vagaries of
the budgetary process and that the legal system emits clear and consis-
tent signals to those who might be tempted to offend. Absent private
enforcement, potential defendants would have a considerably stronger
incentive to lobby against public enforcement efforts or to seek to cur-
tail funds to public enforcement agencies. Ultimately, private enforce-
ment helps ensure the stability of legal norms by preventing abrupt
transitions in enforcement policy that have not been sanctioned by the
legislature. 26 Finally, there is nothing inevitable about the current pat-
tern in which the private plaintiff piggybacks on the government's ef-
forts. Counter-examples can be cited even within the context of
antitrust enforcement where the government instead piggybacked on
private enforcement.27
society by his activities because resources are consumed unproductively. Still, this lost op-
portunity cost falls not on the taxpayer but on the unsuccessful enforcer. Thus, the alloca-
tion of the cost differs significantly.
25. Also, private enforcers cannot force settlements in weak cases by threatening the in
terrorem penalties of incarceration or the public censure associated with a criminal convic-
tion. Although the public prosecutor lacks any profit motive that might lead him to bring
weak or marginal cases for their nuisance value, a prosecution can be motivated by ideologi-
cal, political, and careerist motives, and it is an open question as to which set of perverse
incentives is more dangerous. For a vigorous assertion of the thesis that public enforcers do
so bend and twist the law to achieve their regulatory objectives, see R. KARMEL, REGULA-
TION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE
AMERICA (1982).
26. For example, between 1975 and 1982, the SEC sharply reduced the number of ac-
tions it brought against accounting firms; in 1975, 23 cases were initiated and, as of August
10, 1982, only one. See Hudson, "SEC Goes Easier on Accountants, Relying More on Self-
Regulation," Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1982, at 29, col. 4. Absent private enforce-
ment, this deregulation, which appears to have resulted as much from budgetary cutbacks as
from changes in political philosophy, might result in under-enforcement of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
27. For example, widespread price fixing in the gypsum wall board industry was first
revealed in a private treble damage action; later, the government began its own investiga-
tions. See United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 383 F. Supp. 462, 465 (1974).
Another obvious example was the government's lengthy (and ultimately unsuccessful) pros-
ecution of IBM. For years, the government's attorneys piggybacked on the work of the
private plaintiffs (chiefly, Control Data) whose more experienced attorneys undertook the
major discovery and document review work. Although the government lost, Control Data
obtained a favorable settlement. See Brill, "What to Tell Your Friends About IBM,"
American Lawyer, April, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
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Indeed, because only the private attorney general has the spur of
the profit motive to encourage him and because he typically learns his
trade during an early apprenticeship within the field of public enforce-
ment (either in a regulatory agency or a U.S. Attorney's Office), one
might logically expect private enforcement efforts to dwarf those of
public agencies, as young public attorneys general would mature into
older, more skilled private ones, with the public agency chiefly serving
as the prosecutor of last resort for unprofitable cases and novel legal
theories. 28 Instead, we see today a very different spectacle, one resem-
bling the Oklahoma land rush, in which the filing of the public
agency's action serves as the starting gun for a race between private
attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative class action settle-
ments, which public law enforcement has gratuitously presented them.
If the consequences of such comic-opera spectacles were limited to
the participants, there might be little cause for concern. But a more
troublesome consequence of the current chaos has been increased judi-
cial skepticism about the social utility of litigation conducted in this
manner. In response, courts have begun to narrow and limit substan-
tive statutory rights, seemingly because of their distaste for the process
by which such rights are enforced. To be sure, dissatisfaction with the
performance of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorney is not the only
reason for this erosion. Courts understandably resent the burdens
these cases place on them; class and derivative actions are typically
complex and time consuming, proceed at a glacial pace, and tend to
proliferate a variety of collateral issues. In addition, our legal culture
has always been ambivalent about the bounty hunter, accepting him at
critical junctures as a necessary evil, but harassing and restricting him
at other points in an entirely inconsistent manner.29 As at least a par-
tial result of these interrelated factors, recent Supreme Court decisions
in the fields of antitrust and securities law have imposed new standing
28. Public enforcers may have very different incentive structures from private enforcers,
with the result that they may tend to concentrate on those cases likely to generate greater
publicity and political visibility. Public enforcers also may be more interested in the impor-
tance of a legal precedent and thus more willing to seek to break new legal ground, because
of the psychic income associated with such a victory. In contrast to private enforcers, public
enforcers may be less interested in the financial damages recoverable, because money dam-
ages do not automatically correlate with greater visibility or the establishment of new
precedents.
29. Professor Rhode states the underlying value conflict well: "A fundamental premise
of American adjudicative structures is that clients, not their counsel, define litigation objec-
tives." Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982). The Ameri-
can Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility clearly embodies this view in
Ethical Consideration 5-1, which states:
"The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties
[VOL. 42
19831 PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 229
and evidentiary hurdles in the path of the plaintiff.30 Symbolically cul-
minating this trend was the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision, which
rejected the "private attorney general exception" to the "American
rule" and thus prohibited fee shifting in the absence of express legisla-
tive authorization. 3' This result, only a few years after the Court's unu-
sual award of interim attorneys' fees in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. ,32
shows the pendulum has swung from Frank's early optimism to a cur-
rent pessimism about the utility of the private attorney general.
Accordingly, if one believes that the concept of the private attor-
ney general remains valid, it is important to diagnose what has gone
wrong. In overview, this article will argue that the incentives today
held out to the private attorney general are both inadequate and
counterproductive in terms of the social interests that private enforce-
ment of law is intended to serve. To understand this contention, it is
essential to understand first how the most distinctive feature of the pri-
vate attorney general model affects the litigation and settlement pro-
cess. Put simply, the hallmark of the private attorney general is that as
a practical matter he is unconstrained by the dictates or interests of a
specific client. How does the attorney's "emancipation" from his client
change the outcome from what would obtain were the client in a better
position to control his attorney? This article's answer is that four con-
sequences tend to follow from the necessarily weak control that the
... [H]is personal interest ... should [not] be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1971).
Acceptance of the plaintiff s lawyer as an entrepreneur who performs a useful social
service by generating deterrence arguably confficts with the traditional priority assigned to
the client. See Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1577-78
(1976). This basic tension crops up in a number of areas; one example involves the ability of
the attorney to advance litigation expenses to his client. If the litigation is to be controlled
solely by the clients, then logically the client should be the one ultimately responsible for its
costs. Conversely, if the client is just an historical artifact and the lawyer-entrepreneur is the
real party in interest in the large antitrust class action, then the attorney should be permitted
to fund the litigation. Symptomatically, current law compromises: Disciplinary Rule 5-103
(B) permits a lawyer to advance expenses "provided the client remains ultimately liable for
such expenses." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1971). The
Kutak Commission has proposed a liberalization of this rule under which the client need not
reimburse the attorney if the action is unsuccessful, but must reimburse him out of the pro-
ceeds of any settlement. See Findlater, supra note 6. ContiAuing controversy seems likely,
because there is a basic conflict here about the nature of the lawyer's role. Some accept and
some reject the "view of the lawyer as a calculating entrepreneur regulated by calculating
judges." See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 481.
30. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 441 U.S. 11 (1979).
31. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
32. 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
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client can exercise over the attorney in complex class and derivative
actions, and together these consequences weaken and potentially crip-
ple private enforcement of law by means of the private attorney
general:
1. The Factor of Risk Aversion--Because the lawyer as bounty
hunter has reason to be more risk averse than the clients he represents,
his relative independence from his client implies also a greater danger
of inadequate settlements, which in turn undercuts the deterrent threat
of the law. For example, assume that in a given case, the plaintiff has a
fifty-fifty chance of securing a one million dollar judgment. If the
plaintiff is risk neutral, he will accept a $500,000 settlement (which sim-
ply reflects the fifty percent probability of an adverse judgment), but if
he is risk averse he will accept less (although if he is a risk preferrer, he
will demand more than $500,000 to settle). 3 Why should the attorney
be more risk averse than his client? As others have recognized,34 the
private attorney general typically has more at stake than his client, for
whom the recovery may be de minimis on an individual basis. If the
attorney has invested years of effort, the litigation may represent the
most important asset (albeit a contingent one) on his personal balance
sheet. In addition, where the attorney has borrowed to finance the liti-
gation, he literally may face insolvency if the judgment were for the
defendant.35 In short, once we recognize that the private attorney gen-
33. For a fuller discussion of risk aversion and its impact on the enforcement of law, see
Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Atitudes Toward Risk. An Economic Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1973). See also ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 2, at 120-29.
34. In Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion),
aff'd per curiam en banc by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 28 (1966), Judge Friendly put the matter succinctly:
The plaintiff stockholders or, more realistically, their attorneys have every incentive to
accept a settlement that runs into high six figures or more regardless of how strong the
claims for much larger amounts may be. . . . [A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more
than the vision of a much larger one in the bush, attainable only after years of effort not
currently compensated and possibly a mirage.
See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.):
There can be no blinking at the fact that the interests of the plaintiff in a stockholder's
derivative suit and of his attorney are by no means congruent. . . . The risks in pro-
ceeding to trial vary even more essentially. For the plaintiff, a defendant's judgment
may mean simply the defeat of an expectation, often of relatively small amount; for his
lawyer, it can mean the loss of years of costly effort by himself and his staff.
35. For example, in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. 244
(S.D. Tex. 1978), the lead plaintiffs counsel, Stephen Susman, was obliged to separate from
his original law firm and form a new firm with several of his partners who were also active in
the case; they then financed the litigation through a $400,000 bank loan. See Lempert, supra
note 17, at 11, col. 1. It is not surprising that a law firm would break up over a decision
whether to invest the firm's resources so heavily in a single high-risk action. The new law
firm that Susman and several of his co-partners formed to continue the litigation invested
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eral is an entrepreneur, who assesses costs and benefits in the same
manner as do other economic decision-makers, then we must realize
that the more substantial his investment, the greater his probable level
of risk aversion and the higher his vulnerability to a settlement offer
which would be rejected by a risk-neutral decision-maker. Although
defendants also may be risk averse, their greater size, financial re-
sources, and ability to insure or seek indemnification creates an imbal-
ance - which predictably tilts the bargaining in their favor.
- Risk aversion produces not only inadequate settlements that un-
dermine the deterrent value of private enforcement, but also fosters re-
sponsive counter-strategies by the private enforcer that are equally
destructive to the utility of private enforcement of law. If the private
enforcer is risk averse and therefore will not gamble his time and effort
on an extended litigation, his most logical strategy is to bring a high
volume of cases, thereby spreading his risk, but in consequence invest-
ing relatively little time or effort in any single case. Exactly this pattern
of high caseload coupled with little investment in case preparation
seems to characterize some areas of private enforcement; for example,
defendants' attorneys have long complained that the plaintiffs' bar in
derivative actions tends to file a large number of actions based on only
a cursory familiarity with the underlying transactions.36 To the risk-
averse plaintiffs' attorney, this strategy is efficient because a high vol-
ume of cases may give him a greater certainty of the same economic
reward through multiple small settlements than does an equivalent in-
vestment of time in a single action of greater merit.37
75% to 80% of its time during its initial year in the Corrugated Container case and received
little other income. Id. To do this, one has to have a fairly high level of risk tolerance (or a
very optimistic view of the litigation odds), and in most law firms there will be many unwill-
ing to take such a gamble or subsidize those attorneys who are so willing. Hence, it is
difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys to associate with a firm having a large diversified practice
and able to carry the high-risk litigation during its pendency. The author is also familiar
with other examples in which plaintiffs' law firms have fissioned over similar issues.
36. Of course, plaintiffs' lawyers will dispute this characterization, and it is not the point
of this article to associate greater virtue with either side in the litigation. Yet, as a result of a
number of conversations with both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys who engage in de-
rivative action litigation, I have heard recurrent reports of some specific plaintiffs' attorneys
who do file a high volume of such litigation in the hopes of obtaining a few quick settle-
ments. In the parlance, these attorneys are derisively called "pilgrims" (because they believe
in "early settlements"). Some defendants' attorneys in Delaware have asserted to me that
one or two plaintiffs' firms active in that jurisdiction may account for as much as 25% (or
more) of the pending derivative actions in the Delaware Chancery Court. Whether or not
this is exaggerated, it is an economically rational (if undesirable) response to the problem of
risk aversion which a solo practitioner or small firm must regularly face.
37. Portfolio diversification is a standard economic method to reduce volatility risk by
reducing the variance associated with an expected return so that the expected return is made
more certain. If, for example, the plaintiff's attorney could be certain of a 50% return on a
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Still, although a strategy of risk diversification through a high-vol-
ume, low-intensity practice makes sense for the individual attorney, its
overall social utility is highly dubious, because it both fills the courts
with actions of questionable merit and encourages the stigmatization of
plaintiffs' attorneys as "strike suiters." The critical point here is not the
propriety of such behavior, but the evident social interest in encourag-
ing alternative means of reducing risk aversion that do not produce
socially harmful consequences. Based on this diagnosis, this article will
offer a specific prescription that relies on the standard answer of eco-
nomic theory to the problem of risk aversion - namely, portfolio di-
versification. Here, this means permitting and encouraging the
plaintiff's attorney to diversify his portfolio in a manner that permits
him to accept a higher level of risk and to concentrate intensively on
the single case, rather than scattering his attention diffusely.
2. The Danger of Collusion-The possibility of collusive settle-
ments grows in direct proportion to the attorney's "independence"
from his client. The naked self interest of the bounty hunter lies in his
fee, not the recovery to the class. As others have said many times, the
parties can find a variety of means by which to trade a low settlement
for a high attorney's fee, once the client becomes only a distant by-
stander to the litigation. 8 To say this is not to claim that plaintiffs'
attorneys systematically subordinate the class recovery to their own fee,
but it is to say that the plaintiff's attorney is subject to a serious conflict
of interest -. one that can distort the settlement process and reduce the
$1,000,000 class action, he would not settle for less than $500,000 (discounted to present
value), and he would reject the much lower settlement that would be accepted by a risk-
averse decision-maker who cannot afford the all-or-nothing gamble that a trial imposes on
him. For a concise introduction to the concepts of expected return, variance, and risk aver-
sion, see W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRIN-
CIPLES 145-55 (1980).
Several means are possible by which to reduce risk through risk diversification, but
some of these are inconsistent with the policy objectives of the private attorney general. For
example, the high-volume, low-yield practice discussed above reduces variance but converts
the private attorney general into the "strike suit" extortionist of the defendant's lore. Alter-
natively, the attorney can associate with a firm having a diversified practice, but this is diffi-
cult to achieve if the firm's partners are reluctant to subsidize the lengthy litigation. For an
example of a firm fissioning under this strain, see supra note 35. A third means of reducing
variance is fee-sharing or work-sharing agreements among plaintiffs' attorneys, so that recip-
rocal participations are exchanged. This concept is discussed infra in the final section of this
article. See infra text accompanying notes 148-152.
38. With respect to the dangers of private or "sweetheart" settlements in representative
actions, Judge Friendly has been particularly outspoken. See supra note 34. See also
Handek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions - Part I, 22 Sw. L.J. 767,




deterrent effect of private litigation - whenever the determination of
the fee award is not made a sufficiently direct function of the size of the
recovery so as to align the interests of the private enforcer with those of
the class he purports to represent. 39 As will be seen, the existing incen-
tive structure does little to assure such an alignment but does much to
prevent it.
3. The Absence of Property Rights in the Action-The effective
absence of the client also creates a problem of nonexcludability: be-
cause no practical means exist by which the typically large class can
select or reject its own attorney, multiple attorneys volunteer to serve as
counsel to the class by filing separate parallel actions. These actions
are then consolidated by the courts, and in the complex bargaining pro-
cess that necessarily follows to choose the lead counsel, the bounty es-
tablished by the state to reward the private enforcer is divided among
them and thus diluted. As a result, the individual attorney lacks a suffi-
cient incentive to invest time or money in the preparation or develop-
ment of private actions; he cannot be assured of being able to capture
the expected return (the fee award) because he cannot exclude other
attorneys who may wish to join in the action.' In economic terms, this
is a classic problem of inadequately specified property rights - the
private attorney is in the same position as an inventor who knows he
cannot patent an invention that he forsees or a prospector who cannot
stake out a legally binding claim. In such situations, one cannot rea-
sonably expect the inventor or prospector to invest the same effort in
search and discovery as they would if they could be assured of the abil-
ity to reap the full economic return from their invention or discovery.4'
39. An important qualification is necessary: The attorney cannot perfectly align his in-
terests with those of the client that he represents. Both the hourly rate formula and the
percentage-of-the-recovery formula have their characteristic deficiencies. See Clermont &
Currivan, Improving the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 536 (1978).
40. As will be discussed infra, the court generally will not deplete the settlement fund in
order to pay attorneys' fees below some minimum level. Existing practice strongly suggests
that there is some maximum percentage of the fund that the court will give to the attorneys
(usually in the 20% to 30% range). See Mowrey,,Attorney Fees in Securities Class Actions and
Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. LAW 267, 343-48 (1978). Thus, the more attorneys who enter the
action (either as intervenors or through consolidation of parallel actions), the more this de
facto percentage ceiling on fees will tend to reduce the fees obtainable by the initial entrants.
In addition, because lead counsel has a disproportionate voice in determining who is paid
attorneys' fees, the political process surrounding his selection in effect becomes a struggle
over the allocation of this economic return. As a result, the nonexcludability of late entrants
opens up a political bargaining game over the allocation of the attorneys' fees, and this in
turn chills the incentive to invest time or effort in the first instance by the initial private
enforcer.
41. For a discussion of this general problem, see Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LAw & ECON. 683 (1980).
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4. The Disparity in Search Costs-A fourth characteristic of pri-
vate litigation in which the linkage between the attorney and his client
is tenuous is that high and uncertain "search costs" are connected with
such litigation. The point here is not simply that it is difficult to dis-
cover or prove that covert activities such as price-fixing or insider trad-
ing have occurred, but that the attorney without a "true" client lacks
the initial source of information that the attorney has in other forms of
litigation - the data that his client provides him.42 Self-serving and
incomplete as client revelations often may be, they at least supply a
valuable starting point and save effort; with them, the attorney has only
to verify; without them, he must play private detective. Without a cli-
ent to tell him what has happened and faced with high search costs, the
lawyer as bounty hunter still has one cheap source of information-the
government, which provides him with free information in the form of
indictments, complaints, official reports, and investigations. 43 Not only
is such information free, but the government also may make it incon-
testable through the operation of the familiar principles of collateral
estoppel if there has been a prior proceeding that resulted in a judg-
ment. 4 In short, the government subsidizes the bounty hunter by in
effect telling him how and where to find his prey.
When we integrate the foregoing four factors - (1) risk aversion,
(2) the potential for collusion, (3) an inadequate system of property
rights, and (4) the disparity in search costs - we generate a simple
model that has substantial predictive power by which to explain con-
temporary patterns in class and derivative actions. Together, these fac-
tors explain: why the private enforcer rides the government's coattails
and seldom initiates his own cases (because of factors (1), (2), and (4));
why antitrust settlements seldom produce recoveries that exceed simple
compensatory damages despite the treble damages provision of the an-
titrust laws45 (because of factors (1) and (2)); and why some recent class
actions have had a hundred or more attorneys representing the plain-
tiff's side (because of factor (3)). Concise as this statement is, it still
leaves much out (as all models inevitably do). This article does not
insist that an abstract model can explain everything of interest (either
to the bar or to a policy planner), nor does it deny that complex institu-
42. Significantly, the few cases in which private antitrust enforcement preceded a gov-
ernmental proceeding were those in which there was an active client who supplied the attor-
neys with the relevant data. See supra notes 18 & 27.
43. See Reich, supra note 2, at 1065 ("Plaintiffs' counsel can increase their revenues...
by depending upon the government to undertake test runs of liability in advance.").
44. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
45. See DuVal, supra note 15, at 1329 (finding that defendants in his study had paid
"substantially less than the damages allegedly suffered by the class. ... ).
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tional arrangements must be examined in detail before appropriate re-
forms can be safely proposed. Indeed, this article's principal concern is
with the application of theory to practice. Thus, its central thesis is
two-fold:
(1) on the theoretical level, the foregoing factors explain why the
private attorney general model is not working as intended; and
(2) on the applied level, our existing structure of legal rules and
practices compounds the dilemma at the critical junctures, either
by aggravating the problem or by blocking logical reforms.
Before proceeding to analyze the perverse incentives that current
law has generated, it is important to limit the foregoing analysis to the
context in which it is intended to apply. There are today two basic
types of private attorneys general: the "ideological" and the "en-
trepreneurial." The former is typically organized into "public interest"
law firms, is financed by foundations or membership donations, and
tends in general to be faithful to, and closely controlled by, the social
and political groups that he is serving. The latter is our true "bounty
hunter," motivated by the financial recovery obtainable, rather than by
psychic income, and effectively beyond the control of the typically
large and amorphous class of clients that he seeks to represent. The
entrepreneurial attorney has considerable reason to regard his fellow
plaintiffs' counsel as more his competitors than his colleagues, because
they are all engaged in a race to claim the prize which in effect has been
offered them by the prior governmental proceeding or investigation.
This article addresses only this latter context and does not intend that
its analysis should be applied to attorneys who are either motivated by
political or ideological goals or employed by organizations able to di-
rect their efforts. Nor does its analysis apply in those areas of litigation
where the client is effectively able to control his attorney (such as in the
non-class action private antitrust action) or where other factors (such as
low search costs) produce a very different incentive structure than that
discussed above.46
Today, it is clear that in some areas of litigation - private anti-
46. For example, few would deny that the private attorney general has won significant
victories (both financial and precedential) in securities fraud actions. See, e.g., Escott v. Bar
Chris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). In these cases, the plaintiff class was both numerous
and widely dispersed, but search costs were low because the likelihood of a legally cogniza-
ble injury was signalled by the decline in the market price of the issuer's stock. The intelli-
gent private enforcer therefore had substantial reason to believe that an investigation by him
would disclose the omission of a material fact (or material misstatement) that would support
a successful class action. Indeed, a catastrophic decline in market price virtually assures the
private enforcer that there must somewhere be an actionable disclosure violation.
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trust class actions, securities class actions, shareholder derivative ac-
tions, and mass tort and product liability cases - the "entrepreneurial"
private attorneys general predominate, while in other areas - civil
rights, environmental law, and poverty law - the "ideological" private
attorneys general are the principal players. This dichotomy may not
last much longer. As foundation support for public interest law wanes
and as more attorneys become acquainted with the substance of (and
profit potential in) fields such as environmental law and employment
discrimination, one would expect to see a migration of "en-
trepreneurial" attorneys into these latter fields. The field of employ-
ment discrimination probably already represents an intermediate case
in which the plaintiff's attorney is substantially motivated by economic
considerations, but also is constrained by the smaller size of the plain-
tiff class and the typically intense interest of at least some of the injured
plaintiffs in these actions.
Thus, few prophecies seem as safe as the following one: if we fail
to come to grips with the deficiencies in the current regulation of the
private attorney general, these same problems eventually will appear in
those fields of law now dominated by the "ideological" private attorney
general. Ultimately, the choice is either a rehabilitation of the private
attorney general concept, or a continued trend toward judicial win-
nowing of class and derivative actions, as courts impose more proce-
dural and evidentiary hurdles on the plaintiff because of their
dissatisfaction with the cases they see brought before them.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PERVERSE INCENTIVES
Courts today regulate the lawyer as bounty hunter at four princi-
pal stages: (1) at the class certification stage, the court determines if the
representation is adequate and the case sufficiently manageable so that
it may proceed as a class or derivative action;47 (2) the court approves
the selection of a lead counsel from among the contending plaintiffs'
counsel and thereby has at least potential control over the organization
and staffing of the action;4 (3) the court approves the settlement pro-
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Of course, Rule 23 mandates that the court make a
number of other determinations as well, but the issue of adequacy uniquely goes to the
character of the representation and so affords an opportunity for regulation of the lawyer as
bounty hunter. See Cullen v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 566 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir.
1977); National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). Discovery is normally permitted to a party with
respect to the issue of counsel's adequacy. See, e.g., Stahler v. Jamesway Corp. 85 F.R.D. 85
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
48. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92 (5th ed. 1981); see also Goodbody,
Complex and Multdistrict Litigation, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 71, 73-74 (1974). This area
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posed to it by the parties;4 9 and (4) the court determines the attorneys'
fees to be paid a successful plaintiff's counsel and thereby in effect sets
the bounty.50 Classically, the third stage has been the one designed to
protect the legal system from improper settlements that benefit the
plaintiffs' attorney, but not his clients. But by most accounts, judicial
scrutiny of the settlement's adequacy has proved to be a weak reed on
which to rely. As Judge Friendly has said, once the adversaries lock
arms to present the settlement to the court, "all the dynamics conduce
to judicial approval of the settlement."' I This is not to say that courts
cannot detect improper settlements (for plainly they have done so),52
but that any system that depends upon extraordinary vigilance by
judges is inferior to one that by structural redesign minimizes the ex-
isting incentives for collusion and delay.
Accordingly, this article will focus on the stages of fee determina-
tion and case organization where existing practices most exacerbate the
theoretical problems earlier discussed. At these stages, the current in-
centive structure, it will be argued, tends to:
(1) foster de facto collusion between the adversaries;
(2) encourage a Dickensian level of delay and duplication on the
level of his famous Jarndyce v. Jarndyce;53
is not directly addressed by statute or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but MacAl-
lister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958) is often cited as recognizing the court's author-
ity to appoint a "lead counsel" who would have substantial control over the plaintiff's side of
the litigation. See id at 68-69 (dictum). See also Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc. 557 F.2d
759, 773 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Air Crash at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1017 (5th Cir.
1977). A sample order establishing the powers of such appointed lead counsel is set out in 1
J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92-1 (2d
ed. 1981).
49. For the governing standards to be used under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), see MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1981).
50. For the currently governing "lodestar" standard, see infra notes 56-63 and accompa-
nying text.
51. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), aff'd
en banc by an equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 28
(1966).
52. See, e.g., Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fistel v.
Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 500 F. Supp. 36
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Although appellate courts will often grumble about irregularities in the
settlement process, they are hesitant to reverse, and fond of concluding that the policy con-
siderations weigh heavily in favor of upholding settlements. See In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 228
(1982); Materson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953). Cf. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
53. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1980 ed.). Dickens described this litigation thusly:
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, be-
come so complicated that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it under-
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(3) produce a plaintiffs team that is often organized and run along
the lines of a W.P.A. work relief project; and
(4) result in a system-wide misallocation of effort under which the
private attorney general restricts his role to that of a vulture feed-
ing on the carrion left by public enforcers and seldom stalks his
own prey.
These are strong statements and deliberately so. At the same time,
however, this thesis does not assert that the concept of the private attor-
ney general is doomed to failure, but only that we have designed a
system whose principal features now ensure its own frustration. Inter-
estingly, the legal rules that seem most responsible for this current dys-
function in private enforcement are of comparatively recent origin,
dating from no more than a decade ago. Thus, the curious paradox is
that just as our legal system has accepted the bounty hunter, it has cor-
respondingly changed the rules in a way that frustrates the forces it
unleashed. If all this suggests a somewhat schizophrenic quality to our
legal system, it may well be a recurring characteristic of our legal cul-
ture that formal changes accepted on a doctrinal level are still fre-
quently resisted and partially nullified on the less visible level where
operational decisions are routinely made. Behind this phenomenon
may lie such factors as cultural lag, bureaucratic resistance, and profes-
sional self-interest, but also it may be the case that this apparent para-
dox is the result of a stalemate under which the proponents of the
private attorney general have won on the theoretical level but have
been checked on the operational level. In short, our society's actual
acceptance of the private attorney general may be more tentative and
incomplete than it first appears.
stand it least, but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it
for five minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innu-
merable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have mar-
ried into it; innumberable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have
deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce without knowing
how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little
plaintiff or defendant who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and
Jarndyce should be settled has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted
away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grand-
mothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills
in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three
Janrdyces left upon the earth perhaps since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his
brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its
dreary length before the court, perennially hopeless.
Id _t 20.
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A. The Financing of the Private Attorney General- the Incentives For
Collusion and Delay
To understand why the incentives are today perverse, it is useful to
begin with a brief historical background. Until the early 1970's, plain-
tiff's counsel in a class or derivative action was basically compensated
under a "salvage value" or percentage-of-the-recovery formula, which
typically awarded him somewhere between twenty percent and thirty-
five percent of the financial recovery that his efforts produced for the
class.54 This exception to the normal "American rule" that each party
must bear his own litigation expenses was based on the attorney's crea-
tion of a common fund, which principles of equity and unjust enrich-
ment dictated could be assessed for his fee. 55 With the revision of the
Manualfor Complex Litigation in 1973, however, a new formula was
proposed that essentially compensated the attorney based on the time
he reasonably expended on the action.56 In the Lindy and Grinnell de-
cisions,57 the Second and Third Circuits quickly adopted this "lode-
star" formula, under which the number of hours the attorney
reasonably expends in the action are multiplied by the attorney's nor-
mal hourly rate; and then, a "contingency bonus" may be added in the
court's discretion, chiefly to compensate the attorney for the risk as-
sumed by him in taking a contingent fee case.5" Although each federal
54. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders'Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
784, 813 (1939); Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Actions and Derivative suites, 3 J.
CORP. LAW 267, 334-36 (1978). For a blunt holding that 20% of the recovery was a reason-
able measure of the value of services rendered, see Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224
F.2d 80, 83 (6th Cir. 1955). One author has concluded, after surveying some 60 decisions,
that prior to the appearance of the lodestar formula in the 1970's, the standard percentage
was between 20% and 30% for recoveries under $1 million and somewhat less when the
recovery exceeds that level. See Mowrey, supra, at 337.
55. See Dawson, Lawyers andInvoluntary Clients. Attorneys' Feesfrom Funds, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1597 (1974).
56. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.47 (5th ed. 1981). For the conclusion
that the 1973 revision of the Manual initiated the recent transition in the formula for the
award of attorneys' fees, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS 940-41 (5th ed. 1980).
57. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy I"); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("Lindy H/"); City of Detroit v. Grin-
nell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. Once this "lodestar" amount is computed, the court then moves to a second stage
and determines if a bonus or "multiplier" is to be added to compensate the attorney for the
risk he assumed and the deferral of his payment. For an in-depth analysis and critique of
this element of the lodestar formula, see Leubsdorf, supra note 4. The Second Circuit's
decision in Grinnell appears to have been the first appellate opinion explicitly to instruct trial
courts to increase the contingency bonus in proportion to the risk of the litigation. See City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974). Recent surveys have found
the contingency bonus (or "multiplier") to have averaged around 50% (or 1.5 times the
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circuit court today has its own slightly different phrasing of the lodestar
formula 59 and a treatise could be written with respect to the subsidiary
issues involved in its computation,6" the more important fact is that in
the vast majority of federal courts plaintiffs' attorneys are now compen-
sated based on the time they expended (or claim to have expended), not
on the recovery they obtained. This transition from a percentage
formula to a time formula has an obvious impact on the incentives held
out to the plaintiff's attorney: it creates an incentive to multiply the
hours.6 1 To paraphrase General Electric's old slogan, a lawyer's "pro-
"lodestar" hourly base), but in some cases multipliers as high as 3.5 and 4.03 have been
awarded. Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 479 n. 36. See also Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403,
414 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (fee multiplied by 3.5 multiplier).
59. In particular, the Fifth Circuit uses a somewhat different approach under which the
trial court is to consider 12 specified factors. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 71-19 (5th Cir. 1974). But the Fifth Circuit appears to have reinterpreted their
approach so that it today is consistent with the Lindy/Grinnell standard. See Copper Li-
quor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Anderson v.
Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 149 (4th Cir. 1981).
At least seven of the federal courts of appeals have now approved the award of
contingency bonuses. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 473 n. 1.
60. In particular, the following issues have given rise to a substantial volume of
litigation:
(1) Should the "reasonable hourly rate" be judged by local community stan-
dards in the district court in which the action is brought, or by those of the community
in which the attorney works, or by nationwide standards? The trend is toward the local
community in which the action is brought. Compare Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d
240 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying local standards) with Jorstad v. I.D.S., 643 F.2d 1305
(8th Cir. 1981) (vacating nationwide standard). Arguably, such a rule is neutral, but
perhaps more importantly it also protects the court from local criticism, because it
spares it the necessity of awarding large fees to higher-priced urban counsel while
awarding only a lower hourly rate to local or regional firms.
(2) Should the hourly rate be the current one of the attorney or his historical
one over the course of the action? There is currently a conflict among the cases. Com-
pare Richerson v. Jones, 506 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (historical rate) with
In re THC Financial Corp. Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 721 (D. Hawaii 1980) (current rate).
(3) What time should be disallowed? Disagreements exist as to whether
hours spent in preparing the attorney's fee petition should be allowed. Compare Jorstad
v. I.D.S., 643 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1981)(allowed) with Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160
(2d Cir. 1980) (disallowed).
(4) When is the time actually expended still unreasonable in light of the re-
sults obtained? See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) ("It does not follow
that the time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably expended.").
(5) What sorts of time records should be required and how standardized and
contemporaneous must they be? See Nat. Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec. of De-
fense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (detailed summaries based on contempo-
raneous time records required).
61. Defense attorneys have objected that as a result of the lodestar formula it now takes
longer to settle a case because the plaintiffs' attorneys have an incentive to stretch out the
negotiations. See Herzel & Hagan, Plaintiffs'Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions,
LITIGATION 25-26 (Winter 1981). To this claim, the economist may retort that the plaintiff's
attorney has an opportunity cost the same as any other businessman and will not waste
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gress" is now his most important product.
What prompted this transition from a percentage-of-the-recovery
formula to a time formula? First and most important, federal judges
had become embarrassed by the enormous fees that plaintiffs' attorneys
had received in some much publicized antitrust treble-damage class ac-
tions. In the typical class action in which a governmental action pre-
cedes the private one, the conventional wisdom is that the plaintiff has
only to "shoot fish in the barrel." Yet following the famous electrical
equipment price-fixing case of the early 1960's, a percentage-of-the-re-
covery formula resulted in individual attorneys receiving fees estimated
at around ten million dollars for a relatively brief investment of time in
a simple case. 62 The chorus of protest at this result (much of it from
self-interested defendants) made judges receptive to any formula that
did not expose them to criticism for awarding a windfall profit.63
Second, a time formula was doctrinally attractive because it ena-
bled the legal community to view the private attorney general not as a
bounty hunter, but rather as simply a lawyer compensated in the same
manner as other lawyers have been since time immemorial: on the basis
of his hours of service to his client. Once again, the basic ambivalence
of the legal community toward the bounty hunter surfaces here and
makes a time-based formula intelectually inviting, because it permits
collective repression of the dirty little secret that the bounty hunter has
no real client. Scholars have suggested that the legal community has an
hours pointlessly. But, the "normal hourly billing rate" of most attorneys is likely to be
substantially in excess of their true opportunity cost because at that rate most attorneys have
additional time available; thus, their hourly rate is not the equilibrating price that brings
supply and demand into balance. Hence, even in the absence of fabricated hours or rates,
there is an incentive to delay.
62. See Bruck, "Harold Kohn Against the World," supra note 17, at 29 (estimate of
Harold Kohn's fee). Kohn is also quoted in this same article, estimating that his own fee
was less than that of another counsel in the action, Milton Handler.
63. This sensitivity to the criticism that courts were awarding windfall profits is particu-
larly evident in the Grinnell decision, which includes the following quotation: "For the sake
of their own integrity, the integrity of the legal profession and the integrity of Rule 23, it is
important that the courts should avoid awarding 'windfall fees' and that they should avoid
every appearance of having done so." City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 469 (2d
Cir. 1974) GrinnellI, quotedin City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (2d
Cir. 1977) (Grinnell II). The Lrndy/Grinnell lodestar formula must be recognized as at least
partially motivated by a judicial desire for self-protection. To be sure, a desire to minimize
the appearance of unjust enrichment is a legitimate concern, and courts should guard their
own prestige carefully. But ironically, Lindy and Grinnell have not much affected the
amount of fees received by plaintiffs' counsel, at least in cases with recovery amounts of
more than $1 million. See Mowrey, supra note 40 at 343-48. Rather, they have chiefly
served to insulate courts from criticism about the amount of such fees. Understandable as a
desire for self-protection is, it appears here to have been purchased at the price of both
increasing the possibility of inadequate or collusive settlements and creating an incentive for
dilatory tactics. In this author's view, this price has been much too costly.
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essentially pre-industrial view of itself as in effect a cottage industry of
individual craftsmen.64 In this light, a time-based formula enabled the
bar to maintain a nostalgic, but false, consciousness of itself as profes-
sionals performing in essentially the same way as the nineteenth-cen-
tury English barrister.
Finally, the increasing popularity of nonpecuniary settlements in
securities law actions and derivative suits created a need for a formula
that looked to something besides the value of the relief secured, at least
in those cases where the relief was intangible and not capable of easy
valuation. During the 1970's the Supreme Court repeatedly empha-
sized the importance of disclosure to investors and in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co ,65 it used language which suggested that disclosure was a
valuable benefit in itself, regardless of the fairness of the underlying
transaction. Mills thus put the Supreme Court's imprimatur on the
nonpecuniary settlement. These settlements became increasingly popu-
lar later in the decade as the result of both the challenges by "public
interest" law firms to management's actions during the foreign corrupt
payments scandals of the 1970's and the explosive growth of environ-
mental litigation in which pricing the value of clean air, pure water, or
preserved wilderness was simply not practical.66 The next step in this
development seems, in hindsight, inevitable given the intellectual ethos
of the 1970's: liberal reform became exploited by those having ulterior
purposes. Amidst the hyperbolic rhetoric of that era, it was difficult to
recognize that a liberal-sounding idea, which made considerable sense
64. Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 1117, 1184-86
(1981).
65. 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). The Mills Court further noted: "In many suits under
§ 14(a),. . . it may be impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit." Id. Where this
is true, a justification for a time formula certainly exists, although one can reasonably debate
how often this is the case in the corporate and antitrust fields. In any event, this justification
for use of a lodestar formula is overbroad when applied to those areas where the value of the
benefit can be determined.
Prior to Mills, some courts had recognized in the context of derivative actions that a
"substantial benefit" could be realized without a monetary recovery accruing to the corpora-
tion. See Bosch v Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn.
1960); Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1949). But these cases usually
involved an injunction or other equitable remedy against an actual or threatened injury,
whereas in Mills disclosure itself became the benefit.
66. A much-discussed case during this era was Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-
1455 F (C.D. Cal. 1974), which involved foreign payments made by Northrop and resulted
in the appointment of new outside directors. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION 175-76 n. 28 (1976). See also Herhily & Levine, Corporate Crisis.- The Over-
seas Payment Problem, 8 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L BUSINESS 547, 617-18 (1976). Without
questioning the sincerity or idealism of those involved in these actions, this author believes
the legacy of these decisions is at best mixed and probably unfortunate, because they invite
the fabrication of an illusory "benefit" by which to justify the award of fees.
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in one context, could be regressive in another.67 Once entrepreneurial
attorneys saw that legal fees could be justified on the basis of the corpo-
rate therapeutics contained in these nonpecuniary settlements, they too
became enchanted with the potential of this formula. Today, in some
states the nonpecuniary settlement appears to be becoming the preva-
lent form of settlement in derivative actions.68
Against this backdrop, it is possible to explain why and how the
incentives for the private attorney general have become perversely mis-
guided: The inherent potential for collusion between parties has been
greatly enhanced by the recent acceptance of nonpecuniary settlements
and by the transition away from a percentage-of-the-recovery formula.
The potential for collusion, of course, is present in any class or deriva-
tive action, because an inherent conflict of interest exists between the
attorney and the class he represents. The latter is interested in the size
of the settlement; the former, in the size of his fees. Thus, to the extent
the attorney regards only his own self-interest, he would prefer a
$500,000 settlement out of which a $300,000 award of attorneys' fees
would be paid, to a $1,000,000 recovery out of which only a $200,000
fee would be paid. To the attorney's clients, the second alternative is
four times as profitable (on a net basis) as the first, but to the attorney
the first settlement yields a fifty percent higher fee recovery. 69 Because
the typical class in antitrust, securites, or corporate litigation is widely
dispersed and receives only a de minimis recovery on an individual
basis, its members typically have little ability or incentive to pay close
attention to the case, and hence the defendant may be able to exploit
this conflict simply by offering a higher award of attorneys' fees than
could be obtained after a litigated victory for the plaintiff.
1. Nonpecuniary settlements-The inherent conflict of interest be-
tween the plaintiffs attorney and the class he represents predates any
recent development, but it has been intensified by the advent of nonpe-
cuniary settlements. These settlements in effect allow the parties to cre-
ate a counterfeit currency with which to inflate the value of the
settlement in order to justify a substantial fee award without the de-
67. The benefit in environmental litigation cannot be feasibly quantified and hence the
lodestar formula is appropriate for that context.
68. The author has been informed by one Delaware counsel experienced in derivative
litigation that nonpecuniary relief has become a standard part of most settlements in deriva-
tive actions in that all-important jurisdiction, and settlements that involve no cash contribu-
tion by the defendants to a setlement fund are now common.
69. The net recovery in the first case is $200,000 ($500,000 minus $300,000) and in the
second case $800,000 ($1,000,000 minus $200,000, or four times the former net recovery);




fendant incurring any counterbalancing loss. Increasingly, the pattern
in derivative actions is for the action to be settled on the basis of nonpe-
cuniary relief: a new audit committee is appointed, corporate by-laws
are revised, some additional disclosures are made, and the claim for
damages is dropped.7" The corporation in whose name the action is
brought (and not the individual defendants) then pays the plaintiff the
reasonable value of his attorney's fee to compensate him for the "suc-
cess" he has achieved.7 The net result is that the plaintiff's lawyer is
well paid, the defendant incurs only nominal financial liability, and the
intended beneficiaries of the action - the stockholders - get very lit-
tle, if anything.
In the economist's language, this is the perfect case of a nonzero-
70. For a representative case, consider the settlement in Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas
Corp., 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,716 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1982). In a derivative
action alleging proxy rule violations, the settlement relief was exclusively nonpecuniary,
consisting of revised corporate procedures and additional disclosures to shareholders. The
two primary plaintiffs' counsel were awarded fees of $129,450 and $90,437, respectively, and
the latter had earlier received an interim fee of $74,000 in the same action in 1978. In short,
fees of nearly $300,000 are paid out by the corporation, but the benefit received in return
consisted exclusively of corporate therapeutics. Although the experienced trial judge in that
case was obviously concerned about the potential for a windfall and significantly scaled
down the fees from the amount originally requested, the real problem here is the potential
for inadequate and possibly collusive settlements based on an illusory benefit.
Such cases are not isolated examples. See also Fischman v. Wexler, 309 F. Supp.
976 (D. Del. 1970) (benefit found in "corporate therapeutics"); Tanzer v. Huffines, 345 F.
Supp. (D. Del. 1972); Lewis v. Anderson, 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,003 (9th Cir.
1982); ($110,000 awarded to plaintiffs' attorney, although derivative suit was dismissed, on
grounds that shareholder ratification obtained as a result of the action was a substantial
benefit); United Operating Co. v. Karnes, 482 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Two exper-
ienced defendants' counsel have recently stated the issue well:
Members of the bar who have engaged in the settlement of derivative-type litigation
have experienced the contortion of creating a benefit "package" that will pass judicial
muster, justify the payment of agreed counsel fees and cost the involved corporation 'as
little as possible." It is submitted that the creativity in developing such a package does
not serve to carry out the policies inherent in the substantial benefit doctrine, and fur-
ther serve to encourage the strike suit.
Aronoff & Freeman, "Shareholder Derivative Actions - a Continuing Balancing Effort,"
National Law Journal, November 16, 1981, at 28, col. 2, quoted in AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 423 (Tentative Draft No. 1 1982). See infra note 119.
71. Derivative actions differ from class actions in that plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are actu-
ally paid by the corporation in whose name the action is brought rather than deducted from
the settlement fund. This difference traces back to Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939). As a result, derivative actions are more vulnerable to collusive settlements than
direct class actions, because in a class action there is no mechanism by which the absent class
members can be taxed for the fees of their self-appointed attorney. Thus, the attorney in a
class action must be paid by some cash contribution by the defendants. But in a derivative
action, the plaintiffs' attorney can be paid by the corporation, even if there is no cash contri-




sum game, In a classic zero-sum game, such as poker, the total win-
nings exactly equal the total losses; any gain is at another player's ex-
pense. But in the nonzero-sum game, both sides can improve their
positions. In the case of the derivative action, this is achieved by set-
tling the action for only cosmetic relief and then causing the corpora-
tion, not the individual defendant, to pay a substantial fee for the
negligible benefit the plaintiff has secured for it. Typically, the corpo-
ration will then also indemnify the defendant for his own litigation ex-
penses. In effect, the costs of the litigation are foisted upon the absent
shareholders. Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that courts have
come to doubt the social utility of private enforcement litigation when
they see the majority of such cases ending not with the bang of victory
or defeat, but only the whimper of dubious settlements.
The popularity of nonpecuniary settlements is not limited to the
context of derivative suits. It is only more prevalent in this context
because of the procedural quirk in derivative actions under which the
corporation pays the legal fees of plaintiff's counsel (a factor which per-
mits the individual defendants to escape without any cash contribu-
tion). But the same use of nonpecuniary relief to enable the adversaries
to "hype" the value of the settlement and thereby to justify a substan-
tial fee award recently has appeared in the antitrust context as well. In
a recent price-fixing case involving real estate brokers in Montgomery
County, Maryland, the adversaries agreed to a settlement under which
the defendants would have made no cash payment to the victims of the
conspiracy (notwithstanding the unique treble-damage provisions of
the antitrust laws), but instead would have given eligible plaintiffs cer-
tificates redeemable for brokerage services at a five percent brokerage
fee on the sale of their next home.72 Needless to add, the plaintiffs'
attorneys received not script, but cash. Ironically, a problem developed
with this proposed settlement: other brokers, who were not defendants,
protested it on the grounds that it would have created a monopoly and
excluded them from the market.7 3 As a result, the settlement was thus
72. In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,
860, at 78, 973 (D. Md. 1979). This case appears to have been a piggyback action that
followed a prior criminal trial. The central allegation was that the participant real estate
brokers conspired to raise their commission rates from 6% to 7%; thus, the 5% rate was in
theory a discount. Defendants also agreed to pay $350,000 to cover costs and attorneys' fees.
73. See Latimer, supra note 13, at 1573-74. The obvious problem for the other
nondefendant brokers was that a 5% commission, rather than being necessarily a penalty,
was a price discount that could attract additional business. On a large enough volume it
might produce a gain, rather than a loss, for the defendants in the same manner that high
volume discount stores tend to outcompete small retailers. Eventually some 100
nondefendant real estate brokerage firms agreed to be bound by the settlement. In effect, the
court appears to have put in place a formal price tariff (i.e., the 5% rate) which otherwise
19831
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
revised in order that nondefendant brokers could also be bound by the
same terms. Thus, despite a prior criminal conviction and the substan-
tial liability that the treble-damages provisions of the antitrust laws cre-
ate, the only cash payment made by the defendants was for plaintiffs'
attorneys fees.
The future of nonpecuniary settlements seems depressingly bright.
It is easy to imagine other cases in which a counterfeit currency could
similarly be invented: in environmental impact cases, a few trivial dis-
closures could be made in an amended impact statement in return for a
substantial award of fees to counsel; similarly, in an employment dis-
crimination case, the plaintiffs attorney could agree to settle for revised
testing procedures, corporate employment quotas, and similar relief,
but no financial damages. The more important injury in settlements of
this sort is not to the goal of victim compensation, 74 but to that of deter-
rence, because inadequate financial penalties (particularly when com-
bined with the minimal fines that public agencies can levy) signal that
the law lacks credible sanctions and therefore can be violated with rela-
tive impunity. To state it bluntly, the ultimate danger is that the corpo-
rate law-breaker will know that, even if detected, it can bribe the
plaintiff's attorney - who represents the real threat of financial sanc-
tion - through the medium of the nonpecuniary settlement coupled
with a high fee award.
2. A time-basedformula-Alone, the nonpecuniary settlement repre-
sents only a modest danger, because if the court senses that the relief
obtained was only cosmetic, it can award only a trivial attorneys' fee,
would have probably been per se illegal. In fairness to the court, it did hear considerable
evidence as to both the limited solvency of the brokerage firms and the value of the script
certificate; eventually, it determined that this value was approximately $790, whereas it
found that the average loss was between $566 to $682. These figures are, however, necessar-
ily speculative, and the case may stand more as an example of how a hard-working coalition
of adversaries can undercut the deterrent threat of a treble-damages penalty. Certainly , it
seems symptomatic when those not sued wish to be bound by a settlement. Once again
Judge Friendly's dictum about all forces conducing toward the approval of the settlement
appears confirmed.
In contrast, see In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d
1106 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979), for a decision exhibiting more skepti-
cism about a primarily nonpecuniary settlement. There, the primary benefit of the settle-
ment was an extension of the warranty on those Oldsmobiles, Buicks, and Pontiacs equipped
with lower-priced Chevrolet engines. The Circuit Court rejected this settlement, in part be-
cause of the "irregular conduct of the negotiations leading to the settlement." Id at 1130-31.
74. In cases such as the Montgomery County Real Estate Brokerage Litigation, the com-
pensatory loss to the individual plaintiff is relatively small. The larger the class, the more
trivial the individual recovery becomes. The Montgomery County litigation confirms
DuVal's earlier noted finding in his empirical study that damages in antitrust class actions
seldom approach simple compensatory damages. See DuVal, supra note 15, at 1329.
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even though it approves the settlement. But here, the second perverse
incentive connected with fee awards enters the picture: The transition
from a percentage-of-the-recovery formula to a time-based formula,
such as the dominant "lodestar" formula, not only encourages the
plaintiff's attorney to be dilatory, but provides the adversaries with a
method by which they can assure themselves that the desired fee will be
awarded if the settlement is approved. Let us suppose that a derivative
action is filed and the adversaries quickly agree in January to a nonpe-
cuniary settlement. A quick settlement cannot justify a high fee award
under the lodestar formula. But if the parties do not present the settle-
ment to the court until the following December, plaintiffs counsel can
expend sufficient time during the interval to justify the desired fee
award under the lodestar formula. 5 Of course, the time so expended
may be largely pointless, being consumed by discovery, motion prac-
tice, and other makework that is not intended to advance the litigation,
but only to justify the pre-determined settlement.
The onus here should not fall exclusively on the plaintiff. Collu-
sion requires two sides, and the defense attorney has an equal interest
in procrastination in order to maximize the hours, because he also can
charge his own client and on a more current basis. Indeed, the defend-
ant is the prime beneficiary, because the ultimate result is a cheap set-
tlement, even if his own legal fees are increased. Only the nominal
client loses, because in a nonzero-sum game, shareholders are the ab-
sent party whose losses fund the winnings. To sum up, the mechanical
nature of the lodestar formula permits the adversaries to predict the
court's fee award and in effect to manipulate it by manufacturing the
hours invested.76
These assertions that the current system for financing the "en-
trepreneurial" plaintiffs attorney encourages collusion and fabricated
time sheets are obviously serious. In some cases, they may properly be
taken to reflect on the ethics and professional integrity of those in-
volved. Precisely for this reason, however, it is important to emphasize
75. This is not simply a hypothetical possibility. Several attorneys have told this author
that they have seen settlements postponed until sufficient billable time was generated. For
such a statement (made by a fellow panelist at the 1982 ABA Annual Convention), see the
comments of Patrick Kittredge as quoted in "Fee Problems in Class Actions," California
Lawyer, October, 1982 at 76, col. 3. One federal trial judge has indicated to the author that
it is often clear to the court when this is occurring, because disputes cease, the parties begin
to cooperate, and yet no settlement is immediately forthcoming.
76. In contrast, under the predominant formula used prior to the formulization of the
"lodestar" formula, the court retained considerable discretion and could approve the settle-
ment, but then award only modest fees where it believed the relief secured was not that
important. For the looser criteria formerly used, see Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189
(1st Cir. 1959). See also supra note 54.
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that the process is more likely to involve tacit collusion than actual
explicit deals by which low settlements are swapped for high fee
awards. In effect, the parties can signal to each other by a discrete
"body english" that they are prepared to accept a settlement below that
which a purely arm's-length negotiation would achieve. Indeed, both
sides might be sincerely shocked at the suggestion that their settlement
was in any respect improper or collusive. But, so long as the plaintiffs
attorney is subject to a conflict of interest (which is present whenever
the fee award is not primarily a function of the settlement's value), the
usual processes of rationalization and self-justification will produce set-
tlements that are well below those that would result from a purely ad-
versarial discounting of the litigation odds.
The only essential precondition to a collusive settlement is that
both sides understand that the plaintiffs fee award will be a function of
the time expended. Given such an understanding (which the lodestar
formula supplies), they need not even negotiate over the fee. Instead,
the defendant's counsel can offer what normally would be an unattract-
ively low settlement; plaintiff's counsel can respond that he needs time
to evaluate it and does not feel he could accept it without first under-
taking adequate discovery to test the strength of his case. This polite
dialogue is implicitly understood by both sides to mean that once plain-
tiff's counsel has run up the requisite hours, the settlement will be ap-
proved. Typically, defense counsel need only agree not to oppose
plaintiffs requested fee award, as to which he is economically indiffer-
ent in any event because it typically comes out of the aggregate settle-
ment and is not in addition to it. If the plaintiff has properly
maintained his diaries and time sheets and can present them in a
voluminous file to the court, the likely judicial reaction is to avoid con-
troversy and accept them more or less at face value. Even if the court
does reduce the hours claimed by, say twenty-five percent, this reaction
can also be anticipated and discounted in advance; the plaintiff has
only to delay the settlement further and overbill by the percentage he
expects to be disallowed in order to obtain the fee he expects.
In short, the collusion is structural, rather than conspiratorial.
Add to this pattern the relatively greater level of risk aversion that
characterizes plaintiffs counsel, and the dynamics of the settlement
process begin to tilt more and more in the direction of inadequate set-
tlements that cannot generate substantial deterrence.
B. The Organization of the Action: The Fallacy of Democratic
Control and the Incentive for "'Free Riding"
Equally serious problems surround the organization and control of
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the plaintiffs side of the case in class and derivative action litigation.
In overview, current practices, as sanctioned by the Manual/for Com-
plex Litigation, encourage the large class action to be organized
through a log-rolling political coalition, in which implicit vote-buying
and other tactics reminiscent of Tammany Hall politics have become
commonplace. At bottom, this phenomenon occurs because the under-
lying assumption is that the plaintiffs side of the case should be demo-
cratically organized on the basis of an election in which each
participating plaintiff's firm has a vote. This democratic fallacy, how-
ever, has resulted in a Gresham's Law effect under which bad attorneys
tend to drive out the good, as those most capable of fulfilling the role of
the private attorney general find the expected economic return dissi-
pated by "free-riding" plaintiffs' attorneys. In consequence, to the ex-
tent that the best of the plaintiffs' bar find themselves in effect taxed by
the worst, they will not undertake the substantial efforts and search
costs necessary to investigate and develop new cases. Instead, they will
pursue only those cases where intervention by additional plaintiffs' at-
torneys is unlikely or where the search costs are low (such as the gov-
ernmentally initiated antitrust action). Thus, we come full circle back
to our original diagnosis that the private attorney general today does
not supplement public law enforcement, but only piggybacks on its ef-
forts. Stated in more colloquial terms, the bounty hunter will not hunt
if he must share the bounty with a posse that never truly joined in the
chase. The larger the posse grows, the greater the dilution of the ex-
pected return and the greater incentive there is for the more skillful
bounty hunter to look for new territory where he can work on his own.
This capsule summary, of course, requires qualification and elabo-
ration, but at the outset a fundamental irony should be noted. In prin-
ciple, one would expect that the adversaries in a litigation should fight,
while those on the same side of the case should cooperate. Yet in class
action litigation as conducted today, the reverse is sometimes occur-
ring: the incentives associated with the financing of class action litiga-
tion tend to encourage collusion between the adversaries, while the
incentives associated with the organization of such actions tend to en-
courage disputes among the plaintiffs' attorneys and permit only a wary
cooperation among them.
To understand why this has happened, it is necessary to take a
closer look at the behind-the-scenes process by which class and deriva-
tive litigation is organized. In a major antitrust, securities law, or mass
tort class action, dozens of plaintiffs' attorneys often appear, and, as an
administrative necessity, control of the case must be centralized in a
lead counsel. As with the criteria for fee awards, the legal status of this
central figure - the lead counsel - has only been resolved within the
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last decade." By informal practice, the plaintiffs' attorneys meet and
elect both a lead counsel and an executive or steering committee. Al-
though the court having jurisdiction over the action has the authority to
select the lead counsel, the Manualfor Complex Litigation instructs the
court, where possible, to let the plaintiffs' attorneys choose their own
lead counsel on the apparent premise that the members of this frater-
nity know each other better than the court does and therefore they
should be allowed to choose their own spokesman.7" Typically, the
very first pre-trial order will designate lead counsel and a steering com-
mittee.79 The lead counsel then distributes work assignments among
the various plaintiffs' attorneys, which in turn means that each individ-
ual attorney's ability to bill hours depends as a practical matter on the
favorable disposition of the lead counsel.8 0 The centrality of lead
counsel's role means that there is often a spirited contest to determine
who will occupy this position. In a major case, the process can resem-
ble a political convention: vote-trading occurs, compromises are struck,
and promises of favorable work assignments are made in return for
support.81
This process of vote-trading, however, cannot be truly analogized
to a political convention because of one critical difference: meaningful
restrictions on voting eligibility are lacking. Whereas the delegates to a
political convention are limited in number and selected by their constit-
77. The position of lead counsel grew out of an earlier practice of appointing "liaison
counsel" and is essentially a child of the Manual For Complex Litigation. As Moore's Fed-
eral Practice notes, the "recommendations contained in [Section 1.92 of the Manualfor
Complex Litigation] are credited with establishing the definition 'lead counsel' who 'would
have greater responsibilities than had previously allocated to 'liaison counsel'...." 1 J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92, at 107
n.226 2d ed 1981. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29,
1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977).
78. The Manual provides: "While the court should not, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, select and appoint lead counsel, the court can request the parties to select
such counsel and encourage the use of judicial power." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION § 1.92, at 121 (5th ed. 1981).
79. For a sample order, see 1 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92-11 (2d ed. 1981).
80. Among the powers conferred upon lead counsel is the scheduling of depositions and
related discovery practice. Typically, lead counsel will assign members of the plaintiffs'
team to conduct these depositions. An individual plaintiffs' attorney not assigned by lead
counsel to conduct the deposition is still free to attend or to ask questions, but because his
presence at the deposition is duplicative, his ability to convince the court that his time was
"reasonably" expended is open to serious doubt. In short, those not assigned to a task by
lead counsel are likely to be seen as superfluous volunteers.
Case law has also recognized that those assigned leadership positions by lead coun-
sel are entitled to a higher multiplier with respect to their time. See In re Equity Funding
Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1337-38 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
81. See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
250 [VOL. 42
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
uents, any attorney with an eligible client can as a practical matter join
the class action. 2 Put simply, this means that the ballot box can be
stuffed. Once an election contest for lead counsel develops, each side
can call upon allies to intervene in the action solely for the purpose of
voting. A norm of reciprocity underlies this process: a candidate for
lead counsel in one action can ask allies to intervene in his action to
elect him in return for a corresponding favor in an action where they
are seeking a prominent position as a lead counsel or committee
chairman.
Initially, the purpose underlying this pattern of reciprocity was to
deter new entrants; the fraternity of experienced plaintiffs' attorneys
would conspire to outvote the nonmembers who might typically inter-
vene in actions brought in their jurisdictions.8 3 Although the real effect
of democratic procedures in the organization of class actions was to
raise a barrier to entry, this process did not necessarily interfere with
the efficiency of the private attorney general because those within the
club were typically better able than most regional firms to conduct this
complex form of litigation. But as practices have evolved, specialists in
the organization of class actions have now appeared on the scene.
These specialists engage not in the usual preparatory work of discovery
82. In practice, this will occur whether or not the attorney in the "tag along" action
wishes his action to be consolidated. Under the rules of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation, separate class actions involving common questions of fact will be referred to a
single judge. See J.P.M.D.L. Rules 9 and 10, 65 F.R.D. 253, 259-60 (1975). If a governmen-
tal investigation or a grand jury proceeding has preceded the private action, the multiple
actions almost inevitably will be referred to the court in which the prior governmental or
criminal action was heard or is pending. Although this is logical, its effect is to produce a
political convention in which any attorney whose action is consolidated can vote. For exam-
ple, in Fine Paper, fifteen separate class actions, filed in eight different federal courts, were
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 446 F. Supp. 759 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978).
Once such a convention becomes forseeable, an incentive then arises to file addi-
tional actions which do not enlarge the class or add new plaintiffs or causes of action, but
enable the attorney or his allies to gain votes. See Bruck, supra note 17, at 29 (quoting
Harold Kohn to the effect that his rivals in Fine Paper were encouraging attorneys "who
don't know where the courthouse is" to enter the action).
83. The modern history of multiplaintiff class actions essentially dates back only to the
electrical equipment cases in the mid-1960's. Until relatively recently, the plaintiffs' bar that
specialized in these cases was relatively small and its members knew one another well. See
Bruck, supra note 17, at 19 (detailing interrelationships). More recently, as new firms not
based in New York, Philadelphia, or Chicago have entered the field, major control fights
have erupted at the outset of the litigation. For example, in the Corrugated Containers case,
a group of Houston-based "Young Turks" seized control of the action away from Harold
Kohn and his allies by convincing the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer
it to Houston, where the criminal action had been filed. See Lempert, supra note 17, and
Bruck, supra note 17 (describing the rivalry between Susman and Kohn). Fine Paper is
distinctive not only in its fierce rivalry, but also in that the dispute there began after the
settlement, instead of at the transfer stage where the contest is usually waged.
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or motion practice, but instead concentrate on political brokerage and
coalition building.8 4 The appearance of such specialists raises the dan-
ger that what was once only an exclusionary practice may now have
become an extortionate one, in which competent plaintiffs' lawyers are
compelled to pay a tribute to these new lawyer-politicians.
The clear and present danger here is that current practices gov-
erning the organization of the large case may result in the worst of the
plaintiffs' bar taxing the best. Unable to capture the economic benefits
from detecting violations of law, the "entrepreneurial" private attorney
general is today in much the same position as a prospector who, having
discovered gold at Sutter's Mill, must still strike a bargain with late-
arriving prospectors in order to perfect his claim to the discovery.
From an ex ante perspective, this state of affairs necessarily dulls the
incentive to invest time and effort. In consequence, instead of develop-
ing his own cases, the "entrepreneurial" attorney tends to tag along in
the wake of public law enforcement actions to feast on the spoils. More
a hyena than a lion, he is so in substantial part because our legal system
inhibits his ability to retain the fruits of his own labors.
C. A Case Study.- The Fine Paper Litigation
To restate the argument to this point, this article has contended
that the legal rules and practices that today regulate private attorneys
general (1) foster implicit collusion between the adversaries, resulting
in inadequate 'settlements; (2) encourage delay, fabrication of billable
hours, and duplication of efforts; and (3) produce "free riding" by "tag-
along" plaintiffs' attorneys, thereby diluting the economic incentive to
develop new actions.
Although anecdotal evidence supporting this thesis can be ob-
tained from almost any attorney who specializes in the field, more im-
pressive evidence has now become available in the form of a detailed
case study - the Fine Paper litigation. Initially, Fine Paper was an
ordinary antitrust class action: filed in 1977, it was the last of several
private antitrust actions brought against the manufacturers of paper
products; here, the defendants were the major manufacturers of sta-
tionery and quality printing paper.8 5 By 1980, the adversaries had
84. In substance, this is the charge that Harold Kohn has directed against members of
the "Chicago Group," who he claimed were themselves not competent to handle the case.
See Bruck, supra note 17, at 29. See also infra note 101 and accompanying text.
85. Several reported decisions have been generated in the litigation, all dealing with
preliminary procedural matters. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 446 F. Supp. 759
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In
addition, a final decision has been rendered with respect to a different class (the vertical
conspiracy plaintiffs). See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982).
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agreed to an initial settlement totalling fifty million dollars plus
interest.8
6
At this point, the real fight over the spoils began among the thirty-
three separate plaintiff firms and eight state attorneys general that con-
stituted the plaintiffs' side of the case. Collectively, some 160 individ-
ual attorneys sought fees totalling twenty million dollars out of the
fifty-million-dollar settlement fund (which with interest totalled sixty-
two million dollars).8 7 This request that approximately forty-percent of
the recovery (before interest) be allocated to the attorneys appears to
have intensified a pre-existing conflict among the lead counsel. Be-
cause a forty-percent fee award would be unusually high, it should
have been evident to the participants that either some fee requests
would be disproportionately reduced or most would be scaled back on
a pro rata basis. Thus, those who submitted reasonable requests were
in a sense the potential victims of those who most inflated their claimed
time. The conflict then erupted: Harold Kohn, co-chairman of the
plaintiffs' executive committee and perhaps the best known antitrust
litigator in the country, asked the court to place a ten million dollar
ceiling on the attorneys' fees, of which two million dollars would go to
his firm.88 Tactically, such a move may have made Kohn appear the
moderate statesman, who was alerting the court to overreaching by his
colleagues. Not surprisingly, it infuriated his fellow plaintiffs, who, if
fees were to be limited, did not want them disproportionately captured
by Kohn. They reacted by challenging Kohn's own two-million-dollar
fee petition.
Now comes the first truly dramatic development in the case: Har-
old Kohn, the acknowledged master of this form of litigation, ex-
86. See "Warfare: Fine Paper Filings Tell Tales of Struggle Within Plaintiffs' Camp,"
Legal Times of Washington, December 7, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
87. A detailed analysis of the fee petitions submitted by the plaintiffs' attorneys in Fine
Paper is set forth in a multi-volume document entitled "Report of Class Member Objectors
in Support of Their Objections to the Petitions for Attorneys' Fees and expenses by Class
Counsel," prepared by Weil, Gotshal & Manges [hereinafter cited as the "Weil, Gotshal
Report"]. Harold Kohn has also supplied the author with copies of the motions he filed
objecting to the award of attorneys' fees. For ease of reference however, all citations will be
to the Weil, Gotshal Report. In total, the thirty-three private law firms and eight state attor-
neys general sought $20 million in attorneys' fees plus over $1 million in expenses for over
70,000 attorney hours and 25,000 paralegal hours expended by some 160 plaintiffs' attorneys
over a three-year period in an action having but a single class of plaintiffs. Weil, Gotshal
Report at 1, 3-17. Although the size of this effort - nearly 100,000 hours by attorneys and
paralegals - obviously raises basic questions about the efficiency and costliness of private
enforcement as compared with public enforcement, this article attempts no comparative as-
sessment but instead focuses on the degree to which current legal rules encourage and ensure
such excessive effort and inefficiency.
88. See Bruck, supra note 17, at 29.
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plained in a lengthy submission to the court that his colleagues' fee
applications were inflated and not made in good faith.89 He docu-
mented his charges with considerable specificity. In particular, he al-
leged that one faction of lawyers had conspired to seize control of the
litigation in order to divide the benefits as patronage. Once in power,
they had multiplied hours unnecessarily and had reciprocally agreed to
approve each other's inflated fee applications. He added that they had
sought to secure his consent by inviting him to raise his own fee appli-
cation, but he had refused. Kohn's bombshell led to an even more un-
precedented development: fifteen giant corporations, all major
purchasers of fine paper (among them Exxon, IBM, and Xerox), inter-
vened in the action to object to exorbitant fees on the grounds that their
interest as claimants in the recovery was depleted by the unjustified size
of the legal fees.90 Through their counsel, the New York firm of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, they undertook an extensive study and audit of the
fee applications filed by the plaintiffs. By cross-checking different at-
torneys' fee applications, they produced evidence which appeared to
suggest fraud, the filing of false statements, and deliberate duplication
of effort. 9 '
To the plaintiffs' bar, this claim by a group of "Business Round-
table" corporations (for whom the total damages in the case would not
have materially improved their aggregate gross revenues) that they
89. Id. In a letter to the author dated October 24, 1981, which enclosed these motion
papers, Mr. Kohn further advised me that he believes "the Lindy formula is ill-advised and
should be disregarded as soon as possible." (Copy of letter on file with Maryland Law
Review).
90. The fifteen objectors were, in the order they appear on the Weil, Gotshal Report:
Xerox, Prudential, Mobil, Time, Texaco, General Electric, Allied, IBM, Union Carbide,
Exxon, McGraw-Hill, General Motors, AT&T, GTE, and Owens-Illinois. These corpora-
tions had filed claims to share in the settlement fund based upon total purchases by them of
over $675 million, an amount, they claimed, that represented 6% to 7% of the total claims
filed by class members. Weil, Gotshal Report at I n. 1.
91. The basic methodology of the Weil, Gotshal Report involved "horizontal" and "ver-
tical" audits of the fee applications of the plaintiffs' attorneys. The horizontal audits sought
to detect duplicative work by cross-checking fee applications to show that an excessive
number of attorneys were engaged in the same task at the same time and the vertical audits
examined the individual fee petitions for overstaffing and evidence of fabricated hours.
Weil, Gotshal Report at 84-101, 204-09.
The most dramatic evidence suggesting fraud and false statements concerns the testi-
mony of one plaintiffs attorney, Stewart Perry, who claimed in an affidavit filed at the ap-
parent request of Weil, Gotshal to have been told by a lead counsel to pad his hours in
return for his services in finding a valuable witness. This alleged statement and other as-
pects of the testimony were hotly denied by those alleged to have offered him this reward.
See Lempert, "'Fine Papers' Lawyer Saw Dream Become Nightmare," Legal Times of
Washington, December 7, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
From the standpoint of this article, the allegations of fraud are of limited relevance
to a policy analysis, and no attempt is made herein to assess them.
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were concerned that their share of the recovery was being depleted by
excessive attorneys' fees was absurd on its face; from their perspective,
the obvious motive behind this intervention in a fee dispute was
harassment.
In March of 1983, the District Court handed down its long-
awaited opinion, which adopted in substance the essential allegations
of the Weil, Gotshal Report and in consequence scaled down the re-
quested fees by nearly eighty percent from twenty million dollars to
slightly over four million dollars.92 In terms even more vehement than
those used by Weil, Gotshal, it announced that its "inquiry had given
substance to the worst fears of the critics of the class action device -
that it is being manipulated by lawyers to generate fees."9 3 Finding the
fee petitions "grossly excessive on their face" and evidence that the
plaintiffs' bar was becoming a "class action industry," the court docu-
mented in voluminous detail the practices used to inflate the fees. 94
Although many will read its persuasive opinion as proof that law
and entrepeneurship do not mix, the most important findings in the
opinion suggest the converse - namely, that collusion had replaced
competition within the plaintiffs' bar and was responsible for the
greater part of the abuse shown to have occurred:
First, of the 100,000 hours claimed to have been invested by plain-
tiffs, the majority of these hours were expended after the initial settle-
ment was tentatively reached.95 Put simply, such post-hoc efforts sound
92. In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, MDL 323, slip op. at 52, (E.D. Pa. March 3,
1983). Total fees of $4,343,103 were allowed plus expenses of $1,121,020. Id. The Weil,
Gotshal Report had implicitly recommended a fee award of $4.5 million. Id at 34. Thus,
the court was even more severe than it had been urged to be by the intervenors. In particu-
lar, the court awarded a 1.5 multiplier for time expended prior to the initial settlements, but
permitted no multiplier thereafter. In addition, the firm of Specks & Goldberg, which the
court described as having "primary responsibility for al the wasted hours, duplication and
gross inefficiency which has marked this case from its inception" was subjected to a "nega-
tive multiplier" of .5. Id. at 49-50. In short, 50% of the time deemed to have been legiti-
mately expended by this firm (whose senior partner was co-lead counsel) was disallowed as a
penalty.
93. Id at 52.
94. Id at 3. The burden that these fee hearings imposed on the Court deserves special
attention. Some 41 hearing days, consisting of 73.5 courtroom hours were consumed by
these hearings plus another 10 courtroom hours on related hearings over the fee petitions,
thus making for a grand total of 83.5 courtroom hours. By contrast, the trial of the principal
litigated case (the "majority states case") in the same proceeding consumed only 198 court-
room hours. Id at 37 n.19.
95. See Wel, Gotshal Report at 21. The initial settlement was reached in September
1980. Yet, to cite one example, six Minneapolis firms entered the case after this settlement
and submitted fee petitions totalling $1.5 million plus expenses. See infra note 101. A sum-
mary of the Wel, Gotshal Report, which condenses the essential evidence, appears in The
American Lawyer issue of January 1982. See "Reading Moody's for $682 An Hour," The
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suspiciously like the manufacture of billable time in order to reach a
level that equals the maximum fee that the court might award under a
percentage-of-the-recovery formula. Kohn had claimed that the case
could have been litigated in 5,000 to 15,000 hours;96 if his estimate is
accepted, some eighty-five to ninety-five percent of the hours expended
may have been unnecessary.
Second, and more important, this "makework" occurred within
the context of a partonage system. What Fine Paper chiefly reveals is
the mechanics of such a system. At its heart was a network of commit-
tees through which those favored by the lead counsel could institution-
alize themselves in order to bill the time allotted to them as payment
for their support. These committees held regular meetings, invariably
well attended by plaintiffs' attorneys from across the nation, but pro-
duced little of discernible value to the litigation.97 A good example in
Fine Paper was the "Industry Analysis Committee," which in theory
was supposed to develop data about market shares and the structure of
industry pricing. Both Kohn and the Weil, Gotshal Report found the
data developed by this committee to have been largely superficial and
useless, consisting mainly of data compiled from earlier bibliographies,
publicly available FTC reports, and the defendants' own annual re-
ports.98 The American Lawyer has had a field day with the fact that
one senior attorney sought to bill $682 per hour for reading Moody's to
compile a list of companies in the industry.99 More revealing, however,
was the elaborate hierarchy of committees and titles that developed
within the plaintiffs' camp in Fine Paper. For every possible function, a
American Lawyer, January, 1982, at 31 [hereinafter cited as "Reading Moody's for $682 An
Hour"].
96. Weil, Gotshal Report at 21.
97. The work of the discovery committee is illustrative. Fifteen subcommittees were
formed to undertake various tasks. Weil, Gotshal Report at 37. Approximately 1,049 hours
were spent on discovery meetings, and 47 different lawyers spent 2,647 hours "coordinating"
discovery. Id. at 148, 145. Approximately 1,984 of these hours were billed by partners. For
example, two senior San Francisco attorneys conducted a deposition in Boston and charged
rates that, after adjustments for multipliers, amounted to fees of $650 per hour and $450 per
hour respectively, plus expenses. Id. at 141-42. Another deposition ran up a total cost to the
class of $500,000. Id. at 202.
98. See Weil, Gotshal Report at 101-11. Throughout the litigation, Harold Kohn ob-
jected with particular vehemence to the activities of this committee, which in his view was
simply employing fifteen or more lawyers in lengthy meetings to discuss publicly available
data of limited value. Id at 105-06. See also "Reading Moody's for $682 An Hour," supra
note 95. In his opinion, Judge McGlynn agreed that this work was "basically useless" and
disallowed the entire time spent by all participants on this committee. Fine Paper, slip op. at
42. Some 1,800 hours were disallowed. Id. at 41.
99. "Reading Moody's for $682 An Hour," supra note 95. The chairman of this commit-
tee nonetheless submitted a fee petition for $1,372,190 plus $59,299 in expenses. See Weil,
Gotshal Report at 260.
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committee was created, each with its co-chairman and subcommittee
chairman. The end result was that everyone got a title. Why? As one
legal newspaper has explained it:
Titles were a valued commodity, since lawyers in 'leadership' roles
can more easily petition the court for a fee 'multiplier,' allowing
them to double or triple their normal hourly billings . . . . The
discovery committee, for example, which had one chairman and
three vice chairmen, had 15 subcommittees which in some in-
stances had three and even four co-chairmen.' 00
All that appears to have been lacking was a plaintiffs' Entertainment
and Prom Committee.
Yet to cite this evidence only as proof of incompetence or greed
misses the main point: Why was this tolerated by lead counsel and the
others in the case who did make valuable contributions? The answer
100. See "Reading Moody's at $682 an Hour," supra note 95, at 31. Harold Kohn has
alleged that his co-lead counsel, Granvil Specks, told him "everybody wants a title." Weil,
Gotshal Report at 20-21. Apparently, nearly everyone got one, unless they were opponents
of the lead counsel. The plaintiffs' side had two Co-Chairmen (Specks and Kohn), a four-
man lead counsel team (all of whom could thereby call themselves "co-lead counsel"), and a
12-member Executive Committee. Id at 26. Standing Committees were then appointed by
the Executive Committee; these included the "Industry Analysis Committee," the "Discov-
ery Committee," the "Rule 37 Committee" and a special team that worked on damage theo-
ries. Id at 112, 129-30, 140-43.
One attorney held titles as a member of the Executive Committee, as Vice-Chairman
of the Discovery Committee, as Chairman of a discovery subcommittee, and as a member of
the trial team, enabling him to submit a fee petition with a multiplier of 3.25. Id. at 419. On
an aggregate basis, the application of multipliers by the plaintiffs' attorneys in Fine Paper
raised the fee request from the proposed $8 million lodestar amount to more than $20 mil-
lion in total fees. Id. at 21. Thus, the average requested multiplier in Fine Paper was 2.50.
Another example of duplicative work was revealed by the way in which pre-trial
conferences were held. Although the court admonished the plaintiffs' team to avoid duplica-
tive hours in pre-trial conferences, most of the firms insisted on sending at least one repre-
sentative to each conference. Id. at 90, 93. Judge McGlynn summarized the waste at this
stage succintly:
Counsel have billed at approximately one-half million dollars for 1,446 hours of prepa-
ration, travel and attendance at pretrial conferences. The class was ably represented at
these conferences by lead counsel and except perhaps for their immediate assistants, the
attendance of the other lawyers who merely sat and watched was superfluous.
Fine Paper, slip op. at 20. Yet another abuse was identified by the court:
Work on the pretrial memorandum was one of the major boondoggles of this case.
Fifty-one plaintiff's lawyers, including twenty-one partners from nineteen different law
firms, and deputy attorneys general devoted a total of over 4,500 hours to the prepara-
tion of this Memorandum - especially extravagant figures considering it was going to
be filed after the Majority States had already filed a similar document dealing with
most of the same issues. Not only were these hours excessive, but many of the partner
hours were poorly allocated because the same work could have been accomplished by
associates and paralegals. Based on the fee petitions, the cost to the class for this one
Memorandum is over $1 million.
Id. at 22.
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appears to be that such meaningless work is assigned as a form of de-
fensive patronage. In part the motivation for such an award of work
was the threat of future opposition - a threat which became particu-
larly credible in Fine Paper once a schism developed between the Kohn
faction and a rival faction (known as the "Chicago Group") that shared
control with Kohn on the executive committee.
As another illustration, the Weil, Gotshal report was extremely
critical of the involvement in the case of a half-dozen Minneapolis
firms, who entered the picture only after the initial settlement was
reached and who, the report claimed, performed no significant services
for the plaintiffs' team (but who nonetheless received substantial work
assignments from lead counsel).'' The real point, however, is not the
waste, but the inherent vulnerability that motivates this kind of pa-
tronage. Any connected group of late entrants, such as the Minneapo-
lis group in Fine Paper, poses a triple threat to those in control of the
case: First, the newcomers could vote as a bloc so as to shift control in
the case of a divided steering committee. Second, their collective oppo-
sition to a settlement could dissuade the court from approving it. Ac-
cording to some commentators, unanimity among the plaintiffs is of
great importance, because any substantial dissension will seriously re-
tard the process of judicial approval and cause a much more critical
examination of the fee petitions. 1°2 Third, a dissenting group might
even convince the court that they could reach a quicker or better settle-
ment if given control of the case. Remote as this threat may seem, the
modem history of class action litigation reveals several instances (ironi-
cally engineered by Harold Kohn on some occasions) in which new-
comers have sought to take control of the case away from the
incumbent plaintiffs' leadership by precisely this strategy. 03 Given the
101. See Weil, Gotshal Report at 179-203. Five of these six firms from Minnesota en-
tered the case en masse in the spring of 1979. Id. at 180. Stewart Perry's affidavit, see supra
note 91, indicates that they were induced to enter by the perception that they would be
favored by those running the patronage system and would receive favorable committee as-
signments despite their lack of experience in the field. Although the favorable disposition
toward them appears to have been partially motivated by their discovery of a critical witness
who could testify to the existence of a pre-fixing conspiracy, it also appears to have been the
product of their alliance with the "Chicago Group" in other cases and their agreement to
drop out of another case. Weil, Gotshal Report at 181-82. Thus, the patronage system in-
volves log-rolling between cases as well as within a particular case. Judge McGlynn also
expressed dismay at the fact that eight firms "did not become involved in the case until well
after the first $30 million in settlements were in the bank and the class had been certified."
Slip op. at 20.
102. See Mowrey, supra note 40, at 292 (1978).
103. See Bruck, supra note 17, at 31-32 (describing Harold Kohn's attempts to assume
control of Corrugated Box, Equity Funding, and Eastern Sugar). Allegedly, Kohn sought to
settle with defendants in both the latter cases, even though he was not on the leadership
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court's own desire to escape a burdensome and time-consuming litiga-
tion, such threats have credibility and thus promote defensive
patronage.
Even more convincing evidence of the failure of the democratic
political process as a basis for organizing the plaintiffs' litigation team
lies in Fine Paper's demonstration of how easily the ballot box can be
stuffed. In Fine Paper, it appears that attorneys not only intervened in
the case in order to vote for their allies, but in some cases filed two
complaints to get two votes.'°4 In other instances, actions were filed on
behalf of clients already protected by previous complaints simply to
allow additional counsel "to get into the case."° 5 Yet these late-arriv-
ing counsel often did not even file damage claims on behalf of their
"clients" to entitle them to share in the settlement; they did, of course,
file fee applications for themselves. In substance, these practices
closely resemble the old machine politician's practice of "voting the
graveyard." Indeed, even the rhetoric of the political campaign seems
to have been borrowed: the leader of the "Chicago Group" appears to
have campaigned for election as lead counsel on a platform that in sub-
team of the plaintiffs. In this light, the patronage system is a response to the almost Hobbes-
ian state of nature that sometimes seems to prevail within the plaintiffs' camp. See also
Wolfram, supra note 15, at 294-98 (discussing abortive attempt by Kohn to reach a separate
settlement in Antibiotics litigation).
104. For an example of a firm appearing on two separate complaints, see Weil, Gotshal
Report at 418. At the initial organizational meeting, voting was conducted on both a "case
basis" (one vote for each action) and a "counsel basis" (one vote for each law firm). Id. at
26. On this dual basis, it was decided to that each law firm would have one vote. Id. This
eliminated the incentive to file multiple actions once a law firm had already appeared, but it
created an incentive to add separate firms as co-counsel to a single action. Thus, one plain-
tiff client (Campbell Office Supply Company) was represented by five law firms. Id. One
consequence of a one-attorney, one-vote rule was to eclipse the significance of the state
attorneys general, who bitterly protested the use of this voting procedure. As the Deputy
Attorney General of California, Mr. Michael Spiegel, pointed out to the trial court, the state
representatives had incurred very significant damages, yet they were being excluded from
the plaintiffs' executive and other committees by private attorneys who were representing
clients who had sustained only minor injury, such as "a mom and pop greeting card store,
[and] a fishmonger from Fort Bragg, California, who buys wrapping paper to wrap fish."
Fine Paper, slip op. at 18. Beltedly, the trial court "recognized the force of Mr. Spiegel's
argument." Id. at 19-20. One answer to this problem might be to certify the state attorneys
general as a separate class. Alternatively, a weighted voting system could be used to cure the
inequality that results when clients who have suffered only minor injuries are given equal
voting power with those who have sustained major injuries. But the danger inherent in such
a weighted voting system becomes apparent when one realizes that it might allow the same
Fortune 500 companies, who intervened in Fine Paper to object to attorneys' fees, to seize
control of the executive committee based on the dollar amount of their claimed injuries.
105. Weil, Gotshal Report at 21-22 (noting that complaints filed during the autumn of
1977 were on behalf of clients whose "interests were already well protected"). Yet many of
these class representatives failed "even to file a proof of claim to share in the settlement
fund." Id at 22.
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stance amounted to a promise of "jobs for all."' °6
The extent of the free riding visible in the Fine Paper case possibly
approaches a record. '1 7 For only one class of plaintiffs, thirty-three law
firms and eight state attorneys general offices, totalling some 160 attor-
neys, sought fees for their participation in the case. Yet some of the
best known and most competent plaintiffs' litigators in the nation
sought and were apparently denied any role in the case.'0 8 This should
not be surprising. As in politics, a patronage system is the antithesis of
a merit system. To the victors go the spoils: those plaintiffs' attorneys
not elected to the steering committee or otherwise rewarded simply
ceased to participate in the case, even though their reputations as excel-
lent litigators in some cases far outshone many of those who were so
elected.
The impact upon the exceptionally able attorney of a class action
having a hundred or more plaintiffs' attorneys deserves special atten-
tion. If one assumes that any sensible court will not deplete the settle-
ment fund unreasonably, a point must be reached (and probably early
on) at which the fees received by the free riders do not further deplete
the settlement fund, but instead come out of the pockets of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys who undertook the original investigative and prepara-
tory work. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that courts resist
allowing the aggregate fees to exceed a fairly constant percentage of the
recovery. 1° The Weil, Gotshal Report implicitly supports this view,
because it found that the major participants had "worked backwards"
by picking a fee that they thought the court might award - here,
twenty-five percent of the settlement fund - and then contrived to in-
flate the hours until they justified that percentage of the recovery on a
106. At the initial organization meeting, Granvil Specks, who was elected Co-Chairman
with Kohn, announced as a "guiding principle" that: "There will be a fair and equitable
allocation of work so that all plaintiffs' counsel can actively participate in the litigation." /d
at 26. In substance, this seems to translate into a campaign promise of "jobs for all."
107. Id. at 16. Fine Paper does not, however, set a record for the number of law firms
involved. Some 57 law firms represented plaintiffs in the Folding Cartons Antitrust Litigation
and sought fees of $17 million. See 1 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.47, at 91 (2d ed. 1981).
108. The Weil, Gotshal Report characterized these as the "'Have Not' Firms." Weil,
Gotshal Report at 34. These included such well known plaintiffs' litigators as Gene Mesh,
and the firm of Greenfield & Schoen. Id at 35. Once he was denied executive committee
membership, Mesh simply "dropped out of the case." Id Although comparisons are neces-
sarily subjective, this author's impression is that the "Have Not Firms" were at least as
highly regarded within the plaintiffs' bar as any of the "Chicago Group." The trial court
also found it "incredible" that Gene Mesh, Fine, Kaplan & Black, and Greenfield & Schoen
were excluded while other less respected litigators were permitted to enter after the initial
settlement. Fine Paper, slip op. at 21.
109. Mowrey, supra note 40, at 343-48.
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time-formula basis. " If so, then the real injury is not that the parties
"worked backwards" to achieve a result equivalent to that under a per-
centage-of-the-recovery formula, but that under such a ceiling, the ap-
pearance of each additional free rider results in a net wealth transfer
from the existing group to him. In short, because the pie is limited, the
addition of each new entrant results in a smaller share for those already
in the case. This problem is particularly aggravated if the court at-
tempts to scale back all fee requests pro rata to maximize the appear-
ance of equality, and, from an ex ante perspective, this is a risk that
must be weighed by an attorney who is considering whether to under-
take a case requiring considerable investigation and preparation. As a
consequence, the appearance of 160 lawyers in one case clearly implies
that the incentives to the plaintiffs' attorney are vastly diluted over
what they would have been had the court shut the door after the first
five or ten attorneys had appeared.
III. MODELS FOR REFORM
If existing legal rules and practices encourage collusion, delay, and
free riding, what can be done? Although courts clearly sense that
something is wrong, recent judicial efforts have focused primarily on
tightening the procedural rules governing the computation and award
of attorneys' fees." ' The upshot of these decisions seems likely to be
only a series of evidentiary and record-keeping reforms intended to
prevent the fabrication of billable hours. Although rules requiring the
filing of contemporaneous time records and similar measures are prob-
ably desirable, only modest expectations can be placed on such re-
forms." 2 In pursuing these limited reforms, courts appear still to be
avoiding the central issue of the linkage between a time-based formula
for the computation of attorneys' fees and the potential for collusion
and inadequate settlements. So long as time equals money and the ad-
versaries have an incentive to collude, various means predictably will
110. Weil, Gotshal Report at 39. Indeed, Kohn alleged that his rivals wanted to ask the
court "for total fees in the amount of $18 million in the hopes of ultimately obtaining a $15
million award .. " Id. at 41.
11. See supra notes 12, 60.
112. Ultimately, such reforms will produce better documentation and more meticulous
record-keeping; they may also prevent some instances of egregious fraud to the extent that
such records must be filed on a contemporaneous basis during the course of the litigation.
But so long as time equals money, attorneys will predictably learn to maintain better
records, and the net improvement largely will be in the art of keeping legal diaries. To the
extent that the court places a higher multiplier on some kinds of activities than on others, the
result may even be counter-productive, as lead counsel will find it more difficult to persuade




be found by which a mutually beneficial deal implicitly can be struck
that is based on nonadversarial criteria unrelated to the strength of the
plaintiff's case. Moreover, if the judicial focus remains exclusively con-
cemed with delay and duplication, it will miss the even more serious
problems associated with the organization and staffing of the case.
Academic proposals have been even wider of the mark. One am-
bitious effort has argued that the contingency bonus awarded the plain-
tiffs' attorney subsidizes actions having a low probability of success,
because the criteria for the award of this bonus instruct the court to
take into account the risk incurred by the plaintiffs' attorney." 3 Thus,
as the probability of success decreases, the risk, and correspondingly
the bonus, increases. As a result, Professor Leubsdorf has argued, a
perverse incentive arises to litigate weak cases. Cogent as this theory
sounds within its four comers, it suffers from a tunnel vision focused
exclusively on the contingency bonus; as a result, it overlooks the far
more important perverse incentive to be dilatory that is built into a
time formula. To the extent there is an incentive to litigate weak cases,
it flows from other factors, such as (1) the ease with which the parties
can collude under a time formula and pass the real costs of the litiga-
tion on to absent parties, (2) defendants' risk aversion, which motivates
them to settle at some low figure rather than risk a substantial judg-
ment; and (3) the desirability to the plaintiff of litigating a large volume
of cases and thereby spreading his risk, rather than concentrating on a
single large case.
Where then should reform begin? The starting point must be to
recognize two truths: First, the problem is not simply that there are a
few "bad apples" within the plaintiffs' bar who require closer judicial
supervision, but it is rather a structural dilemma involving a skewed
incentive structure. Second, it must be realized that all the problems
discussed in this article are interrelated. More specifically, the incen-
tive for collusion between the adversaries and the incentive for
fabrication of time by plaintiffs' attorneys dovetail and reinforce each
other, while the problem of free riding has an inverse relationship with
113. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 491-96. In practice, the average multiplier appears
to be around 1.5. See Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, 6 CLASS
ACT. REP. 82, 84-121 (1980). On its face, this statistic means that on average any action
having less than a 66;6% probability of success is an economically unattractive investment
because a 1.5 multiplier will not compensate for any greater degree of risk. Moreover, even
if an action has a probability of success in excess of 662%, the plaintiff's attorney must
further consider the impact of deferral on the value of his fee. Because interest is not typi-
cally added to the fee award, a delayed payment to the plaintiffs' attorney is worth less than
a current payment, with the margin between them being equal to the time value of money
over the period of the deferral. The multiplier probably chiefly serves the function of com-
pensating the attorney for this deferral. See infra note 116.
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these other two. For example, if we made it more difficult for plaintiffs
to enter a pending action, we would discourage free riding, but we
might also encourage collusion - because the smaller plaintiffs' group
would find it easier to settle with the defendants on the basis of their
personal self-interest.
A course must therefore be steered between Scylla and Charbydis.
This article will assess three basic models for reform, none of which
exludes or is incompatible with the others. Indeed, each is a partial
answer, and none is alone sufficient. In common, they attempt to reha-
bilitate the concept of the private attorney general, rather than to reject
it on the premise that law and entrepreneurship do not mix.
A. Model One.- Setting the Private Attorney General to Watch the
Private Attorney General - The Uncertain Lessons of Fine
Paper
"Who will guard the guardian" is an ancient problem, which ap-
plies with special force to the guardian who is motivated by profit. If
we are to rely seriously on private enforcement of law, some means
must be found to hold the private attorney general accountable. A pos-
sible response to this need is to institutionalize a role for a monitor at
the settlement stage: a second-tier private attorney general, who would
be rewarded for detecting inadequate settlements or excessive attor-
neys' fee applications or both. Essentially, this proposal would genera-
lize the role performed by Weil, Gotshal in the Fine Paper litigation.
Although Weil, Gotshal was clearly not acting as a risk-taking private
attorney general (as it was retained by clients fully capable of paying it
and directing its actions), there have been other recent cases in which
intervening counsel have convinced the court that a proposed class ac-
tion settlement was inadequate and thereby have caused a renegoti-
ation and consequent increase in the settlement." 4 In such cases, the
court has properly rewarded the intervening counsel on the grounds
that its objection caused the increase in the settlement fund.
Is the solution to the problem of collusion this simple? Considera-
ble skepticism seems necessary about both the cost and sufficiency of
this answer, even though an enhanced role for such intervenors proba-
bly is desirable. One deficiency in this prescription is that collusion can
extend beyond the initial parties and include such intervenors as well.
Lead counsel can in effect "bribe" those plaintiffs' attorneys in a posi-
114. See, e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1980). Similarly, in a lengthy
litigation involving the Alleghany Corporation, objectors forced the settlement to be raised
first from $700,000 to $1,000,000 and eventually to $3,000,000. See W. CARY & M. EISEN-
BERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 979 (5th ed. 1980).
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tion to intervene and object to the settlement by offering them a place
on its team and lucrative "makework" assignments. This defensive pa-
tronage is no different in principle from the titles and fabricated assign-
ments awarded by lead counsel to form a majority coalition and
organize the steering committee. Of course, this suggestion that lead
counsel will "bribe" potential intervenors by inviting them on board
plaintiffs' team is intended not as literal description, but as a form of
short-hand. The process would no doubt be more subtle: for example,
lead counsel might invite the potential dissident to develop those legal
theories that it believed had not been adequately explored on behalf of
the plaintiffs' team. This would in turn involve billable discovery con-
ducted at the request of lead counsel, which is more likely to be fully
reimbursed by the trial court.
Arguably, the current pattern of one hundred or more plaintiffs'
attorneys appearing to represent a single class may be at least partially
attributable to a perception by the intervening counsel that lead coun-
sel will feel obliged to offer them work assignments. In other words, if
lead counsel's willingness to pay "bribes" through the medium of
makework assignments becomes widely perceived, then this in turn in-
vites extortion by outsiders. Thus, the "free rider" problem connects
with the problem of collusion, because this perceived exposure helps
attract the horde of "free riders," who themselves may have no inten-
tion of (or capacity for) litigating the case. Once again, the end result is
the subdivision of the potential attorney's fee available to the compe-
tent plaintiffs' attorney - and ultimately the erosion of his incentive.
This vulnerability to collusion potentially could be reduced
through institutional redesign. For example, the court at the outset
could appoint one or more of the plaintiffs' attorneys to the role of
devil's advocate and assign them the task of critiquing any proposed
settlement or fee award. To preclude collusion, the devil's advocate
would be denied the right to participate as a plaintiff's attorney, but
would be compensated independently for his efforts as a watchdog
monitoring his fellow plaintiffs' counsel. Alternatively, the court on its
own initiative could appoint a special master (who would not be a
member of the close-knit fraternity of plaintiffs' attorneys) to duplicate
the extensive audits and cross-checks performed by Weil, Gotshal in
the Fine Paper litigation. Both these alternatives, which each institu-
tionalize a role for an official watchdog, would make it more difficult to
bribe the potential objector into acquiescence, because his official posi-
tion would preclude him from accepting the usual offer to join the
plaintiffs' team as a high-level member. Bribery is ineffective here be-
cause the usual currency of work assignments would have no value to
an attorney who was disqualified from joining the plaintiffs' team.
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The difficulty with this reform is that it achieves its end only by
compounding the already over-lawyered structure of class action litiga-
tion. Indeed, from almost any perspective, this reform is likely to ag-
gravate existing problems. From the court's perspective, the imposition
of a mandatory adversarial hearing in which a devil's advocate would
be paid to attack the proposed settlement and fee award increases the
procedural burden on an already over-worked court. The Fine Paper
litigation is itself proof of this contention: Judge McGlynn spent forty-
one hearing days listening to the rival factions challenge each other's
fee applications and respond to the Weil, Gotshal Report." 5 This is an
extraordinarily costly use of judicial time - particularly when the set-
tlement itself was not in dispute. Yet once we decide to rely on an
adversarial remedy, such a consumption of judicial time seems una-
voidable because the dispute inevitably will be bitter and personal. Ac-
cusations of overbilling are inherently stigmatizing, and the lawyers'
own reputations are in jeopardy. In this context, the "reform" of an
institutionalized critic invites an interminable litigation, in which dis-
putes about overbilling and excessive expenses will be bitterly litigated
paperclip by papercip.
From the perspective of the plaintiffs' attorney, this reform simply
interposes one more round of adversarial hearings between him and
eventual payment. Unlike the defense attorney, he is not paid on a
current basis, nor is interest on the fee award required. Thus, delay has
a high cost for him," 6 and an institutionalized monitor further exacer-
bates this problem by adding a new element of risk as well: having
fought a typically large and better-financed team of defense counsel, he
must now turn around and fight a fellow plaintiffs' counsel, who stands
115. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, MDL 323, slip op. at 3, 37 (E.D. Pa. March 3,
1983). See also supra note 94.
116. Under Lindy, no interest is added to the fee award, but rather this deferral is consid-
ered part of the contingency for which the multiplier is to be elevated. See Lindy Bros
Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976).
But cf. Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 2172-79 (5th Cir. 1980) (interest added from date of
original judgment). A problem with automatic inclusion of interest, however, is that such a
rule would aggravate the existing incentive to be dilatory.
In In re Corrugated Containers Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978),
the plaintiffs' attorneys used Rice University Business School Professor Clifford Atherton to
estimate the necessary multiplier to compensate them for the risk they had assumed. He
found that simply to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for the deferred payment during the
course of that litigation, a multiplier of between 1.695 and 2.019 would be necessary (based
on the Treasury Bill interest rate over the period). Thus, it is doubtful that existing multipli-
ers even compensate for the time value of money, must less the risk premium involved. See




to profit by reducing his fee award. Such a two-front war is exhausting,
as a number of the plaintiffs' attorneys have commented to me.
In summary, even the most ardent champion of litigation remedies
must recognize that there can be too much of a good thing. Although
the right of a class member to object to a settlement or fee award is not
here questioned, it would be the height of folly to convert that right
into a duty by mandating an obligatory devil's advocate. Instead the
search must be for a more economical remedy that does not
voraciously consume judicial resources or overbroadly chill plaintiffs'
incentive.
B. Model Two." Structural Redesign-Preventing Collusion Through
Institutional Adjustments
The principal alternative to an adversarial model is a structural
one. Instead of seeking to prevent collusion by means of case-by-case
intervention, a structural approach instead seeks to realign incentives
and otherwise to eliminate the preconditions to collusive settlements.
Collusion occurs when the adversaries are able to trade low settlements
for high fee awards. To prevent this, several reforms are possible:
First and most obvious, we could return to a percentage-of-the-
recovery formula for the determination of the fee award. At a stroke,
this substantially realigns the private attorney general's incentives so
that his private self-interest is congruent with his public role; "doing
good" and "doing well" are less in conflict, because the more he in-
creases the damages and thereby maximizes deterrence, the more he
personally profits." 7
This point is so simple and basic (and has been made so many
times by others) that one wonders if there are any drawbacks to such a
reform. One obvious objection is that a percentage formula works well
when there is a common fund, but not so well when injunctive, equita-
ble, or other nonpecuniary relief is sought. Of course, one might an-
swer that this chilling effect on nonpecuniary settlements is itself a
117. One qualification however, is necessary: A percentage-of-the-recovery formula may
lead the private enforcer to prefer an early settlement that is not in the best interests of his
client. For example, if a $3 million settlement were possible after six months of litigation,
whereas an additional six months of effort would increase the settlement to only $3.5 mil-
lion, the client who is compensating the attorney on a percentage-of-the-recovery basis (say
25% of recovery) would probably prefer that the attorney pursue the case for the extra six
months (unless the additional half-million dollar recovery was less than the interest on the
recovery over the interval during which the payment of the settlement was thereby deferred).
The attorney, however, would only prefer to continue the litigation if the increase in the
recovery exceeded the increase in his opportunity cost over that interval plus the lost interest
on his fee over that same interval. For a close analysis of these considerations, see Clermont
& Currivan, supra note 39, at 536, 543-46.
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virtue, given the earlier-noted tendency for nonpecuniary relief to serve
as a counterfeit currency by which to "hype" the value of settlement.
But this argument should not be pushed too far. The value of corpo-
rate therapeutics is open to reasoned debate, and the Supreme Court in
the past has given its endorsement to such relief.118 Thus, on the prin-
ciple that the tail should not wag the dog, it seems inappropriate to
deny compensation uniformly to plaintiffs' attorneys for nonpecuniary
relief simply because to do so sometimes may distort the settlement
process.
A sensible compromise is possible: we could require the court to
place an explicit price tag on the value of nonpecuniary relief, which
would then be added to the aggregate financial recovery for the pur-
pose of applying the percentage-of-the-recovery formula. This ap-
proach is the one that has been followed by the pending Principles of
Corporate Governance and Structure.- Restatement and Recommenda-
tions, which is now before the American Law Institute." 9 In essence,
this approach places the burden on the court by exposing it to public
criticism for overvaluing merely cosmetic relief; the issue is deliberately
framed so that the court cannot duck the question of the extent to
which the nonpecuniary relief had real value. In contrast, the time
formula allows the court to evade this critical issue by focusing simply
on whether a "substantial benefit" was produced and whether the attor-
ney's time was reasonably expended. In effect, the time formula makes
the issue of "substantial benefit" a "yes or no" question; yet, in reality,
the critical issue is "how substantial was the benefit."
A second problem with a simple percentage-of-the-recovery
formula is that it may aggravate the already marked tendency for the
private attorney general to piggyback on public enforcement. If the
same percentage of the recovery is applicable to actions that are initi-
ated by the private attorney general as to those that are first begun by a
public agency, it stands to reason that the lower risk, vastly lower
search costs, and shorter deferral of payment associated with private
actions that follow public ones will encourage private attorneys to tag
along in the wake of cases initiated by public agencies rather than to
develop original cases. The simple answer to this problem is to adjust
118. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
119. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07(0 (Tentative Draft No. 1
1982) [hereinafter cited as ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT]. A pending revision of this section
would require the court to "estimate, where practicable, the adverse consequences to the
corporation or its shareholders generally" if such relief had not been secured. A standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" is also required before such relief is deemed a substantial
benefit to the corporation that can justify the award of attorneys' fees.
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the percentage awarded so that it is higher when the private attorney
initiates the action. Similarly, the lodestar's multiplier might also be
adjusted to give a higher contingency bonus in such instances. 120 This
proposal could be adopted by the Manualfor Complex Litigation with-
out legislation.
Still, it remains uncertain how much acceptance this reform is
likely to receive from courts, given the entrenched status the lodestar
formula has achieved.' 21 Thus, an alternative solution, which might be
more easily accepted by courts, would be to set a ceiling on a time
formula equal to some maximum percentage of the recovery (say
twenty-five percent in the case of actions not preceded by a public ac-
tion, and otherwise ten percent). This proposal for a ceiling responds
to two distinct problems that are associated with a straight percentage-
of-the-recovery formula. First, the imposition of a ceiling responds to
the political problem that originally induced courts to accept the lode-
star formula: that a "windfall" fee award might otherwise be required,
even in the case of a very quick settlement. Second, theorists have ar-
gued that a percentage-of-the-recovery formula tends to induce early
settlements that fail to maximize the class recovery. 122 If this is so, a
combination of a time formula and a percentage ceiling removes the
incentive for these premature settlements without giving rise to a
counter-incentive to be dilatory.
This possible compromise, however, requires that two basic
problems be adequately addressed: (1) once again, how to prevent col-
lusive settlements, and (2) how to prevent delay in the prosecution of
the action so that the settlement is not deferred until the maximum
ceiling is reached. Both these problems nevertheless seem capable of
reasonably satisfactory solutions by means other than a percentage-of-
the-recovery formula.
Because collusion requires some certainty on the part of the plain-
tiffs' attorney that the legal fees he expects will be awarded, notwith-
standing the low settlement, one approach to eliminating collusion is to
bar all discussion between the adversaries of the attorneys' fee until
after the court has approved the settment. This prophylactic rule in
effect shifts the discretion over fee determination back to the court, be-
cause the parties are precluded from striking their own private bargain.
120. The ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 119, instructs the court in determining the
size of any contingency bonus to consider, among other factors, "whether the action fol-
lowed a prosecution or other proceeding in which the evidence was developed by public
authorities or whether it was originally initiated by the plaintiff." Id. § 7.07 (a)(2).
121. The lodestar formula has received the apparent endorsement of at least seven of the
federal courts of appeals. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 473 n. 1.
122. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 39, at 543-46. See also supra note 117.
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At present, when the adversaries strike such a deal, they lock arms and
form a powerful coalition to present the settlement to the court. 12 3 In
effect, the court faces the same problems that it does when presented
with a plea bargain. If it rejects the settlement, it knows that a burden-
some litigation will remain on its docket.
But this picture changes radically if any agreement as to the fee
award, or even any discussion of it, is barred between the adversaries.
To the extent such a rule can be enforced, collusion becomes more dif-
ficult: the plaintiff cannot hold the settlement hostage to the fee award
nor can the defendant bribe the private attorney general. More impor-
tant, the parties can no longer present the court with an integrated deal
involving both the fee and the settlement, whose rejection would place
the court in the untenable position of forcing parties to litigate who
want to settle. The premise here is that judicial discretion is desirable;
accordingly, by divorcing the fee award from the settlement we effec-
tively increase the court's discretion to set the fee and thereby regulate
the lawyer as bounty hunter. Ultimately, courts are capable of distin-
guishing a high quality performance by a plaintiffs attorney from an
inferior one. If so, they can adjust the fee award to reflect this in a
manner that is superior to a mechanical percentage-of-the-recovery
formula. But courts can do this effectively only if they are not faced
with a determined coalition of the parties seeking to secure its approval
of a pre-packaged deal.
The legal basis for prohibiting joint resolution of the settlement
and the fee award seems easily justified. Recent case law has begun to
move in this direction and has in some instances found contemporane-
ous fee and settlement negotiation between the parties to be im-
proper.' 24 A number of decisions have also recognized that the
plaintiff's attorney owes a fiduciary duty to the class or corporation in
whose name he sues,125 and this principle provides a conceptual under-
pinning for a prohibition on any linkage between the fee and the settle-
ment. A recent ethics opinion by the Association of the Bar of the City
123. This, of course, is a paraphrase of Judge Friendly's much-quoted phrase in Alle-
ghany Corp v. Kirby, 333 F.2d at 347.
124. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Mendoza v.
United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (dicta), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980) Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (ED. Ill. 1978); Obin v. District No. 9, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582-83 (8th Cir. 1981). Others
have recommended a similar prohibition. See Rhode, supra note 29, at 1251 ("[T]o mini-
mize the potential for financial bias, trial judges should enjoin counsel from negotiating fees
pending settlement of substantive issues, absent explicit court approval."). See also Wolf-
ram, supra note 15, at 293-98, for a case study.
125. See Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Certain-Teed
Products Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241, 243 (2d Cir. 1948).
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of New York also has recognized that the plaintiff may not hold the
settlement hostage to the fee award.126 Cases are scarce, however, be-
cause usually there is no one to object to the joinder of the two ques-
tions and appellate courts are reluctant to reverse elaborately
negotiated settlements on what they probably still see as a technical
point. In sum, we are today at the critical moment when ideas can take
hold and when propositions can leap from the status of dicta to that of
holdings in judicial opinions. In this context, Tentative Draft No. 1 of
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance and
Structure expressly seeks to encourage such a transition by condemn-
ing contemporaneous fee discussions in derivative actions.' 27
Despite this trend, several objections remain to a prophylactic rule
against contemporaneous negotiation of the settlement and the fee
award: First, if a "lodestar" time formula is retained, the parties will
know that time is money and that by delaying the settlement until suffi-
cient time has run, they can justify the desired fee. As to pecuniary
settlements, this danger cannot be wholly discounted although even
here other means exist by which to prevent such delay. For example,
one can give the defendant a means of discouraging such delay by dis-
allowing time expended by the plaintiffs attorney after a reasonable
settlement offer was made by the defendant, unless the ultimate out-
come produced a more favorable result. 28
Still, the more important impact of a bar on pre-judgment fee dis-
cussions is on nonpecuniary settlements. Here, there is little reason
why the court must accept the attorney's time as having been reason-
ably invested when the settlement appears to it to have been a largely
cosmetic one. In this case, the court would have considerable discre-
tion and easily could reject the time it deems unnecessarily expended.
To understand this important contrast, consider two hypothetical cases.
In the first the settlement results in a one million dollar fund and the
plaintiffs' attorneys present time records justifying a $250,000 fee. It
126. See Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Formal Opinion No. 80-94 (1981) reprinted in New York Law Jour-
nal, September 22, 1981, at 2, col. I (legal ethics precludes an attorney "from holding the
settlement of the merits hostage" to the determination of the attorney's fee).
127. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT § 7.07(b). Section 7.07(b) both forbids such contemporane-
ous negotiation and requires all parties and their attorneys to certify to it as to the absence of
such discussions or notify it of any breach. Section 7.07, however, applies only to derivative
actions.
128. One solution to reduce the incentive to delay under a lodestar formula is to disallow
time expended after a settlement offer, if the ultimate recovery does not exceed the offered
amount. The theory here is that post-offer time does not benefit the class unless it enhances
the fund. Such a position is taken in modified form in the ALI Tentative Draft. See ALl
TENTATIVE DRAFT § 7.07(d).
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may well be the case that the court will accept such a fee with only
modest scrutiny, because the court recognizes that the claimed time re-
sults in a roughly equivalent fee to that which would result under a
percentage-of-the-recovery formula. Some empirical evidence suggests
that courts do in fact limit the allowable time in just this manner so as
to equate results under the two formulas. 29 But if the settlement were
instead to provide for only a $500,000 fund and nonpecuniary relief
consisting of revised disclosures and changed corporate procedures,
there is considerable reason to believe that the court would not accept a
$250,000 fee, even though technically justified by time records. To the
extent that excessive fees are now received in nonpecuniary settlements,
the decisive factor is probably the court's reluctance to upset the par-
ties' settlement. Once the issue of the settlement's approval is divorced
in time from the issue of compensation of plaintiff's counsel, the court
could use its own discretion and reduce the fee.
A second objection to this proposal has been repeatedly raised by
corporate defense counsel: quick, cheap settlements are, they have said,
in the corporation's own interest. Particularly in the case of the deriva-
tive actions, they have claimed that the corporation is better served
even in a frivolous case by settling quickly rather than by expending
time and effort litigating to a successful conclusion.' 30 Although this
argument is premised on the debatable proposition that derivative ac-
tions are typically frivolous, this thesis is mistaken even within the four
comers of its own assumptions. It misses the critical distinction be-
tween an expost and an ex ante perspective. 13 1 If one looks only from
an ex post perspective after the action is filed, then indeed the least
costly response to a frivolous lawsuit may be to pay the requested bribe
to settle it, rather than to litigate and eventually have it dismissed. But
from an ex ante perspective, the focus should be on how to discourage
the filing of frivolous law suits. Indeed, from such a perspective, a
known willingness to pay bribes in the form of quick settlements irre-
spective of the merits simply encourages the filing of additional frivo-
129. See Mowrey, supra note 40, at 334-48.
130. Several decisions have even recognized the termination of the litigation itself as a
"substantial benefit" which can justify an award of attorneys' fees. See Weisberg v. Coastal
States Gas Corp., 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,716, at 93,589 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,
1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For a critique of these deci-
sions, see Aronoff & Friedman, supra note 70. From this article's perspective, this attempt to
characterize the cessation of the litigation as a benefit involves impermissible intellectual
bootstrapping, which will encourage the filing of nonmeritorious actions in the future.
131. This distinction is a critical one to economists and is typically missed by lawyers. It
similarly can be used to explain why a passive response to a tender offer should maximize
shareholder welfare. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1177 (1981).
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lous actions. The game theorist, Thomas Schelling, has argued that the
best way to resist extortion is to reduce one's flexibility in advance by
adopting rules that forbid thepayment of ransom or blackmail.'3 2 By
so tying one's own hands, one communicates that one will resist the
threat and so reduces the extorter's incentive to threaten. Correspond-
ingly, a rule that denies defense counsel the ability to agree to a fee
award until the settlement is first approved by the court both reduces
the defendant's vulnerability to extortion while also preventing collu-
sive settlements that enervate the deterrent threat of the private attor-
ney general. Ultimately, collusion and extortion are related problems
that require an integrated solution.
A third objection to a prohibition on discussion of the fee award
before the final approval of the settlement is that a prophylactic rule
may deny the defendant the ability to know his total liability at the
time he enters into the settlement. That is, if the defendant agrees to
settle for a specific amount plus payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees,
he has a legitimate need to know the total sum he must pay; prohibiting
him from obtaining this knowledge inhibits settlements and as a result
consumes scarce judicial time with unnecessary litigation. Exactly this
argument was acknowledged by the Supreme Court last term as a rea-
son for not adopting a prophylactic rule (even though the Court also
noted that the potential for abuse in contemporaneous fee award and
settlement discussions was real).' 33 But this problem largely answers
itself: the Court's decision in Alyeska, prohibiting fee shifting in the
absence of a statute, ensures that in the vast majority of instances the
defendant will know his total liability without having to know the size
'of the fee award. 34 4yeska in effect means that the bounty hunter
must generally look for his compensation to the common fund that the
settlement creates. Consequently, his only entitlement is to be compen-
sated out of this fund, and not to be separately paid by the defendants.
132. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIcT 37-42, 137-39 (1960).
133. See White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453-54 &
n.15 (1982). Although the Court acknowledged that it was "sensitive to the concern" that
prejudgment fee negotiations "could raise an inherent conflict of interest between attorney
and client," it also recognized that "in considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement,
a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages
and fees." Id. Thus, the Court concluded: "Although such situations may raise difficult
ethical issues for a plaintiffs attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no resolution is ever
available to ethical counsel." Id.
134. In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Court
dealt only with the case where there was no common fund and declined to shift the fees to
the defendant in the absence of a statutory authorization. If a common fund has been estab-
lished, however, payment of attorneys' fees out of that fund does not increase the defend-
ant's total liability. Alyeska does not reverse the traditional "common fund" rationale for
awarding attorneys' fees. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1980).
[VOL. 42
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Of course, defendants may be willing to compensate the plaintiffs'
attorney over and above the settlement, by agreeing to shift the fee vol-
untarily. In that event, they would not know their total liability, absent
contemporaneous discussion of the settlement and the fee award. But,
as the Manual for Complex Litigation properly recognizes, 135 such
agreements for separate payment are inherently suspect both because
they mean that the plaintiff class would not know of a disproportionate
fee award at the time it approves the settlement and because interven-
ors would have little incentive to challenge an excessive fee where its
reduction would not increase the size of the net recovery to the class.
Thus, in the last analysis, the objection that a ban on contemporaneous
fee and settlement discussions would unfairly deny the defendant the
ability to know his total liability is true only where fee shifting is au-
thorized by statute. Because fees are not shifted in derivative or most
securities law actions, 36 this objection has no application to these im-
portant contexts.
A final objection is that such a ban is simply unenforceable, be-
cause covert discussions will still occur. Highly competent attorneys
also have commented to me that such a prohibition penalizes the ethi-
cal attorney, who will obey the proscription, and favors those who gain
an advantage through its violation. Two responses to these claims are
in order: First, the unfair advantage that accrues to the less ethical at-
torney is a problem common to most ethical prohibitions, and it has not
proven an insurmountable barrier in other areas. Second, even if some
rate of noncompliance is predictable, this does not deny that there is a
marginal improvement. Moreover, the rate of non-compliance is likely
to be lower than the cynic suspects. Particularly in the case of deriva-
tive actions, a substantial social and professional gulf separates the
135. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1981). See also In re General
Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
136. In derivative actions, fees are paid by the corporation, not the defendants. See W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 114, at 938-43. Under the federal securities laws, fees
are only shifted in the limited number of express causes of action, but not in the far more
numerous cases that arise based on implied causes of action, such as under Rules lob-5 and
14a-9. Thus, the Court's reasoning in White, 455 U.S. at 445, does not apply, and prejudg-
ment discussions of fees similarly should be precluded. Although fee shifting is authorized
under the antitrust laws, fees are not automatically shifted in antitrust settlements, because
the Clayton Act's "successful prosecution" requirement is not satisfied by a settlement. See
In re Armored Car Litigation, 472 F. Supp. at 1380. Thus, because settlements are more
common than litigated judgments and fee shifting is not mandated with respect to settle-
ments, the "common fund" rationale appears to overshadow statutory fee shifting, and it
will be in the minority of cases that the considerations noted by the Court in White will




plaintiff's attorney from the defense bar; little love is lost between them,
and much of the defense bar still regards the role of the bounty hunter
as illegitimate. This is important, because collusion requires an ele-
ment of mutual trust, which is here absent. At least where a clear ethi-
cal prohibition exists, the transgression of which could result in
professional sanctions, bitter adversaries will find it difficult to trust one
another; moreover, the frequently large number of participants in such
actions would also make it difficult to form a sufficiently encompassing
conspiracy to negotiate the fee award in a manner that assured the
plaintiff's attorney that there would be no objection. Here, any dis-
senter or intervenor could breach the understanding and challenge the
fee. Finally, it is this author's perhaps naive belief that although attor-
neys do exploit gray areas of the law, relatively few will violate a clear
ethical prohibition.
To sum up this section, if the concept of the lawyer as bounty
hunter is to remain valid, some means must be found to prevent the
bounty hunter and his prey from working out a private deal superior to
the bounty offered by the state. A ban on fee discussions between them
is a substantial step in this direction.
C. Model Three. Creating A Property Right
Currently, the filing of a major antitrust or securities class action
brings other lawyers out of the woodwork - 160 in Fine Paper, 100 in
Armored Car, and similar numbers in other cases. 137 The result is to
chill the incentives held out to the private attorney general, because he
must share the fruits of any efforts he undertakes with the horde of
"free riders" who follow close in his heels. On the theoretical level, this
situation is by no means unique; rather, it is a classic illustration of the
economics of nonownership. If the patent system were abolished to-
morrow, one might similarly expect to observe reduced investment in
research and development. Few will invest either money or its close
substitutes - time and effort - if the return on their investment must
be shared with an unknown number of others. The nonexcludability of
such "free riders" in turn helps explain why private attorneys general
do not seek out new cases, but instead piggyback on the government's
action. Indeed, the disincentives to the initiation of original private en-
forcement actions are even more forbidding, because in class action
litigation the free riders possess some capacity to block the attorney
who initially filed the action (either by voting as a group to seize con-
trol of the plaintiffs' steering committee or by objecting to the settle-
137. See supra note 17.
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ment). These two factors - nonexcludability and the blocking position
which new entrants potentially occupy - go far toward explaining the
current deficiencies in the operation of the private attorney general.
This diagnosis leads to a fairly obvious prescription: confer a prop-
erty right and cut off additional entrants to encourage the legal entre-
preneur to undertake the search costs that are necessary for the
discovery of new law violations. Obvious as this may seem to the econ-
omist, it predictably will sound outrageous to lawyers, for whom the
idea of the lawyer as a fiduciary for his client is the wellspring of legal
ethics. From this perspective, the concept of the lawyer as an en-
trepeneur who somehow "owns" the action sounds very dubious. Yet
in truth, there is little operative conflict between the two perspectives
on this point, because even the most zealous proponent of a normative
view of the legal profession would have to concede that there is a need
to limit standing at some point well before 100 attorneys separately
appear to represent the same class. The real question then from either
perspective is how to reduce this horde of "free-riding" attorneys to a
realistic number. From the economic perspective, which sees the litiga-
tion as a form of property, the simplest answer would be a "first-come,
first-served" rule, under which the first to file the action is awarded the
property right. The deficiency in this prescription also may seem obvi-
ous: it creates a race to the courthouse, in which unqualified counsel
may gain control over the action. Such races already occur today in the
wake of an antitrust indictment, but the court is not under any obliga-
tion to award the control over the action to the first to file. Predictably,
if the first plaintiff to file is represented by a young lawyer right out of
law school, the court will select someone else as lead counsel.
How serious is this danger that a "first-come, first-served" rule
might result in semicompetent counsel gaining control over the case?
Arguably, even if such a rule awarded the case to a twenty-five year old
novice, without prior experience, he could for a price be persuaded to
turn the effective control of the action over to a more experienced coun-
sel. Clearly, one must go beyond the initial assignment of rights and
ask what happens next. Economists have asserted that, in a rational
world, when transactions costs are low, the party possessing the prop-
erty right will assign it to those who can realize greater value from it.
This proposition, known as the Coase Theorem, 38 states that the initial
allocation of property rights is essentially irrelevant so long as the par-
ties are able to contract among themselves without substantial transac-
tion costs. It predicts that so long as the parties can bargain, they will
138. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
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work out an accommodation that maximizes the value of the property.
Here, the theorem would predict that the less competent counsel who is
appointed lead counsel will negotiate a fee-sharing arrangement with a
more experienced counsel who would actually handle the case.
How valid is this generalization as applied to the rough-and-tum-
ble world of litigation? One standard criticism of the Coase Theorem is
that individuals have a tendency to overvalue their own ability.'" 9 If
so, the initial assignment of property rights remains important because
the parties would not transfer property rights to those able to maximize
value insofar as they overestimate their own capacity. Once we intro-
duce this psychological issue of subjective self-estimates, the special
character of class action litigation tends to make it difficult to rely on
the Coase Theorem. Trial lawyers have notoriously strong egos, and
few objective standards exist by which to distinguish the best from the
merely adequate. In addition, class action plaintiffs' lawyers exhibit a
high tolerance for risk almost as a professional characteristic, because
only those willing to devote years of effort on the chance of victory
remain in the field. Other barriers exist to transfers of control over the
case between attorneys. Such a transfer may be interpreted as an ad-
mission of inferiority on the part of the transferring attorney. To the
extent that it injures his professional reputation, there is a significant
transaction cost involved, and the Coase Theorem is then not applica-
ble by its own terms. 40 In any event, the evidence from the Fine Paper
case does not reveal any inter-lawyer transfers. In fact, some of the
best known and most respected plaintiffs' attorneys in the nation were
excluded from participation by the patronage system, while other attor-
neys without prior experience in the field or other apparent credentials
were given substantial work assignments. 14 1 The implication is that
those who get control hold onto the case, and delegate responsibility
only sparingly.
A second reason for rejecting a "first-come, first-served" rule ap-
plies even if one believed that the case eventually would be transferred
to those best able to exploit it: put simply, such a system effectively
139. The relevance of the Coase Theorem to law has been much debated. See, e.g., Kel-
man, Conscription Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1979); Spitzer & Hoffman, Reply to Conscription Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1187 (1980).
140. By its own terms, the Coase Theorem applies only in a world of zero transaction
costs. Thus, if the attorney would suffer a loss in professional standing by assigning the case
to a more experienced colleague, the payment must compensate him for that loss.
141. As the Weil, Gotshal Report notes, some very experienced firms were excluded from
participation while others with little prior experience in the field were given substantial as-




imposes a tax on the most efficient in favor of those who win the race to
the courthouse. Because a higher bounty increases the bounty hunter's
incentive to seek out new cases, such a tax is undesirable in that it effec-
tively reduces the net award that the legal system holds out to the most
competent private attorneys general.
How then should lead counsel be selected? The simplest answer is
probably best: the court should choose the two or three best counsel out
of the available field and appoint them co-lead counsel. 142 In choosing
co-lead counsel, the court might consider, in addition to sheer ability
and experience, such factors as: geographic diversity (in order to mini-
mize the danger of domination by a small club, which still could nego-
tiate collusive settlements), the relative cost of such counsel (permitting
a New York attorney to run an action to be tried in a Houston federal
court is unnecessarily expensive), the ability of the attorney to finance
extended discovery, other time commitments of the attorney, and the
willingness of counsel to use paralegal employees to further minimize
costs. Once the relevant criteria are thus defined, the potential conflict
between the economic view of the attorney as entrepreneur and the
normative view of the attorney as fiduciary evaporates, because by
choosing the most competent counsel, we also best serve the interests of
the client.
Now, however, comes a critical point: the team of co-lead counsel
so chosen could then retain as many (or as few) additional counsel as
they thought desirable and could distribute their legal fees among
themselves on any mutually agreeable basis. These additional counsel,
however, would possess no right to vote or otherwise revise the compo-
sition of the plaintiffs' steering committee. At a stroke, this disen-
franchisement of the latecomer ends the possibility of patronage
battles, because the subsequently intervening counsel is in effect made
an associate in the plaintiffs' law firm, rather than a partner. In short,
the governance structure is hierarchical, rather than democratic - a
change that kicks the free rider off the bus.
Subsequently filed actions would continue to be consolidated with
the principal action under the same rules as apply today, and interven-
tion would similarly be permitted. But lead counsel would have effec-
tive control over the case (absent a showing of impropriety or
1
142. An economist might suggest that the case should be auctioned off among the plain-
tiffs' attorneys by having them bid in terms of the lowest attorneys' fee that they would
accept. This course seems unsound for two reasons: (1) the attorney having the lowest op-
portunity cost would be the likely winner and he may have such a low opportunity cost
because of a correspondingly low ability, and (2) if the bidding were in terms of percentage
of the recovery, the winning low bidder might be less prepared to invest his funds in trial
preparation and discovery and thus more likely to enter into an inadequate settlement.
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inadequacy), and would make all work assignments. In short, the late-
arriving attorney would have no inherent right to participate in the ac-
tion on behalf of the same class or to bill his time to the settlement
fund, unless lead counsel desired his participation.
Once freed from the defensive need to form political coalitions
and campaign for office on a log-rolling platform of "jobs for all," lead
counsel could negotiate with other plaintiffs' counsel for their services
based on their relative merit. To be sure, personalities, egos, and reci-
procity still may enter the picture, but predictably the "phantom"
plaintiffs' attorney whose only speciality is in the politics of class action
organization would be left out in the cold. Ultimately, the movement
induced by this change in legal rules would be in the direction of an
internally rationalized plaintiffs' "firm," paralleling the structure of the
defendant's law firm.
This last point - that a more hierarchical form of organization is
desirable on grounds of efficiency - deserves a closer analysis: At pres-
ent, even where patronage battles are absent, class action litigation to-
day is conducted on the plaintiffs' side through a network of
contracting participants, who must negotiate among themselves over
each step in the case. Friction is inevitable, and the process is slow.
This division of labor is analogous to General Motors assembling its
cars by contracting with thirty different firms for the constituent parts
and negotiating each sub-assembly stage individually. Of course, Gen-
eral Motors does not do this; rather, it uses subsidiaries, which it can
quickly and efficiently order to produce the parts it needs. Similarly, in
the ordinary law firm, decisionmaking is also hierarchical: the partner
instructs the associate what to do and does not need to bargain or to
contract with him. In sum, this is efficient. As a general proposition,
economists agree that individual firms exist as indivisible economic
units because they outperform the slower, more costly process of mar-
ket exchange. 143 In economic theory, the scope of a firm's operations is
defined as that range within which the firm is more efficient than indi-
vidual contracting relationships. 44
The relevance of this seemingly abstract economic point about the
143. The classic statement of this theme is in Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
144. For a modem application of Coase's insight, see Williamson, The Modern Corpora-
ion. Origins, Evolution andAttributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981). Williamson emphasizes
the "transaction cost economizing" theme in Coase's early work, and sees the modem corpo-
ration as a means of similarly reducing such costs below the level obtainable in the market.
This article similarly suggests that transaction costs can be reduced by substituting a smaller
network of firms for the strange amalgam of up to 50 or more separate law firms that today
attempt to conduct modem class action litigation.
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superiority of hierarchy to market with respect to interrelated economic
activity is best understood when one listens to the complaints of lead
counsel who have sought to administer the plaintiffs' side of a complex
class litigation. Repeatedly, I have heard them complain of the impos-
sibility of getting their subordinate attorneys to take specific assign-
ments or to do work on schedule. In part, this is the product both of
the patronage system which undermines their authority and the intrica-
cies of the "lodestar" compensation system under which different tasks
merit different contingency bonuses. Thus, the lead counsel finds that
all the attorneys on his side of the case want to appear in court, but
none wish to do preparatory work and few will attend depositions at a
remote site.
This difficulty is predictable. In a system where the court allocates
the legal fees, every attorney wants to be seen and known by the judge.
If the allocation of the fees instead were assigned to co-lead counsel,
their authority would be enhanced and the court's work load would be
substantially reduced because it then would have only to set the aggre-
gate fee (under either a percentage-of-the-recovery formula or a time
formula with a ceiling). At bottom, the lead counsel's lack of authority
over his colleagues is inefficient, a cause of delay, and an impediment
to an effective private attorney general system. The optimal answer to
this problem is to encourage the creation of a plaintiffs' firm, which
would be organized along the same lines as an economic firm. In real-
ity, there are substantial barriers to this development, given the ad hoc
character of a single class action.'45 But a hybrid form - resembling a
franchise system - could arise, under which lead counsel would assign
divisible portions of the case (e.g., discovery with respect to particular
defendants, brief writing, motion practice, etc.) to different firms under
a clearly stipulated compensation formula. In contrast, lead counsel
today is in the position of an electioneering politician, who constantly
must promise jobs, favors, and patronage to his constituents, but who
cannot fully deliver and so must dispense his patronage incrementally
in response to pressure.
145. An obvious obstacle is that a single case does not provide the same opportunity for
economies of scale. Another problem is that most full-service integrated law firms find it
difficult to subsidize contingent fee litigation by one or more of their partners. Inevitably,
disputes arise over the allocation of the partnership income when some partners are receiv-
ing current fees from their clients while others are hoping for an eventual large recovery that
is highly speculative. Because different individuals have different tolerances for risk, it is not
unusual that most contingent fee litigation is conducted by small firms whose members share
a common risk preference level. See supra note 35. But this characteristic small size also
denies such firms the ability to achieve what this article will call full portfolio diversification.
See infra note 148.
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An important corollary of this reorganization of the plaintiff's side
of the case is that it eliminates much of the current need for judicial
supervision of plaintiffs' attorneys. A priori, there is no more need for
judicial supervision of the internal relationships among the plaintiffs
than there is of those among the defendants. Once an economic firm is
established, those in control of it can decide the allocation of the pro-
ceeds with their "associates" either by employment contract, piece-rate
systems, or some other means. In contrast, under the current lodestar
system, the court must consume its scarce time reviewing each individ-
ual fee petition, each of which is in competition with every other peti-
tion (assuming that the court typically will not permit the aggregate
attorneys' fees to exceed some maximum percentage of the recovery).
The need for such paternalism vanishes once the "partners" appointed
by the court can hire their own "associates." To be sure, the possibility
of collusion still remains, but this only points up the desirability of ap-
pointing several lead counsel (who are not closely associated) and the
continuing need for legal rules of the sort discussed under the preced-
ing models for reform. Once a firm is created the court would need to
focus only on the size of the aggregate attorneys' fees (as a proportion
of the settlement) and not on its allocation.
Equally important, a judicial attitude of benign neglect should
permit the plaintiffs' attorneys to engage in practices that are now for-
bidden but that are also highly efficient. Currently, "fee splitting" with
attorneys not actively involved in the case is forbidden,1 46 but, as the
cases indicate, the practice seems to be common. 147 From an economic
perspective, fee-sharing agreements with plaintiffs' attorneys not in-
volved in the case are an efficient means of diversifying the risks inci-
dent to a litigation that necessarily will continue over an extended
period.
As noted at the outset, risk aversion is one of the major factors that
cripples private enforcement of law. Few attorneys are willing to bet
their careers on a single case that can extend for a decade. Hence, in-
adequate settlements that do not reflect the litigation odds become
likely. The classic answer of economic theory to this problem is portfo-
146. See Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 17-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiffs'
attorneys found to have entered into an undisclosed fee-splitting agreement under which
each attorney was to receive defined percentages of the recovery paid to lead counsel). In
Lewis, the court in part objected to the failure of the parties to disclose to the court the
substance of the fee agreement, a disclosure which was required by local court rules.
147. See also Kamens v. Horizon Corporation, 1981 FED. SEC. L. REP. "(CCH) 98,007
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1981). In Fine Paper, there are also suggestions of this same practice.




lio diversification. 148 To understand this, consider the position of lead
counsel in a major antitrust action that has just been initiated. He
knows that the litigation may continue for years, during which time he
will receive no legal fees, but must feed his family and pay his mort-
gage. The probability of eventual success may be good, let us say sixty
percent, but there is still a forty-percent chance that he will lose, which
would be an economic disaster for him. In short, he is forced to make
an "all-or-nothing" gamble. In the "real world," where most of us are
risk averse, this inevitably tempts him to accept an inadequate
settlement.
Suppose instead that the same attorney could convert this single,
undivided, "all-or-nothing" gamble into ten individual gambles which
aggregated to the same amount. The difference is between a single coin
flip of a silver dollar and ten coin flips of a dime; as we all know, the
odds are high that over ten coin flips the results will be approximately
half heads and half tails. In consequence, our plaintiffs' attorney can
now more safely rely on the sixty-percent chance of success, because
the variance associated with it has been virtually eliminated. He now
knows that a sixty-percent chance of recovering ten million dollars
under this latter procedure is worth six million dollars, because he has
eliminated uncertainty by a strategy of diversification.
The critical point here is that portfolio diversification is as sensible
and efficient a strategy for the "entrepreneurial" attorney as it is for
other entrepreneurs generally. Any time one can reduce the variance
associated with an outcome without incurring a reduction in the ex-
pected value of the outcome, such an opportunity should be ac-
148. Portfolio diversification is essentially a means of reducing risk. Intuitively, one un-
derstands that it is unwise "to put all one's eggs in one basket." But the underlying logic of
this point involves more than simply the truism that it is wise to hedge one's bets. Through
the creation of a diversified portfolio, one may reduce the volatility risk associated with
investments in other respects. For example, although the expected return of a portfolio is
equal to the weighted average of the expected returns of the individual investments, the risk
level of the portfolio is not necessarily the weighted average of the individual risks. See V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1151-55
(2nd ed. 1979). The standard reason why the aggregate risk level may be lower is that some
risks are inversely related to each other: as one rises the other falls. This "co-variance"
makes the portfolio's risk level lower than that of the average of its investments. Although
the possibility of co-variance is less obvious where the portfolio's individual investments
consist of lawsuits, it could still occur to the extent that legal decisions which reduce the
prospect of success in one case raise that same prospect in another. Even if co-variance is
not obtainable, the creation of a portfolio of investments in legal actions still means that the
shape of the risk distribution that the attorney who goes to trial confronts is less bi-polar
(i.e., a 50% chance of success and a 50% chance of failure), but instead begins to resemble the
classic bell curve. Thus, the attorney should be less risk averse and more able to litigate on
an equal footing with defendants.
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cepted. 149 In abstract theory, the plaintiffs' attorney could achieve
efficient diversification of his portfolio by trading participations with
other attorneys. Actual syndications of lawsuits are rare, of course, but
the simpler alternative which amounts to the same thing in the end is a
norm of reciprocity: Attorney X, as lead counsel, could allow Attorney
Y to participate in his case (and assign work to him) in return for At-
torney Y doing the same in reverse in a case in which he is lead coun-
sel. As long as both attorneys are actually involved in the litigation,
such fee sharing should not constitute an ethical breach.' 5 Indeed, this
latter pattern of reciprocity describes existing practice, within the rela-
tively close-knit antitrust plaintiffs' bar.' 5 ' Although encouraging this
149. In a world of risk averse decision-makers, a premium will be paid to avoid risk. For
a concise explanation, see W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 147-55 (1980).
150. Disciplinary rules forbid fee sharing among those not employed in the same office or
firm, unless there is client consent and the division "is made in proportion to the services
performed and responsibility assumed by each." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1971). In addition, local court rules often require disclosure of
even permissible fee sharing agreements. In Kamens v. Horizon Corporation, the court did
not object per se to fee sharing among attorneys associated in the case, but did reject such a
sharing agreement where it would benefit the lead plaintiff more than the class he repre-
sented. This article does not attempt a close analysis of the proper scope of DR 2-107, but it
plainly sets only an outer limit, rather than a precise standard. In cases where all the attor-
neys participating in the case agree to engage in fee sharing according to some negotiated
formula, some decisions have taken a posture of judicial indifference with respect to the
allocation of the fees among these attorneys. See Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., 457 F. Supp.
1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 921 (D.
Del. June 4, 1979); In re Magic Marker Securities Litigation, 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97, 116 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 395, 400
(D.D.C. 1978). Other decisions such as Kamens have questioned this "doctrine of judicial
indifference to attorney fee sharing agreements" on the grounds that the Lindy/Grinnell
lodestar formula contemplates judicial supervision and regulation of each attorneys' fees.
See Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 1981 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,007 (S.D.N.Y. May 26,
1981).
The pending Kutak Commission's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.5(e) (Final Draft 1982), would significantly revise DR 2-207. This proposal provides as
follows:
A division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(I) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or, by written
agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility to the representa-
tion; and
(2) the client consents to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Id. The commentary to the rule indicates that the required disclosure need not indicate the
share that each lawyer is to receive. This revision would apparently permit fee-sharing
agreements that are not in proportion to the services performed by the individual lawyer so
long as written disclosure is made to the client, the client consents, and the total fee is
reasonable.
151. Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), sets forth a percent-
age sharing agreement in explicit detail. But the better evidence is simply the recurrent
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process of reciprocal exchanges will not alone produce efficient diversi-
fication, it should mitigate the intensity of the risk aversion.
What specifically must be done to permit efficient diversification?
The answer is that very little need be done. Absent restrictions, the
plaintiffs' bar can strike its own deals by which to diversify the litiga-
tion risks its members face.' 52 At present, however, the lodestar
formula impedes their ability to do so. For example, if Attorney X
wished to trade a thirty-three percent interest in the antitrust class ac-
tion he was trying for an equivalent interest in the securities class ac-
tion headed by Attorney Y, this simple and sensible exchange
transaction could most simply be effected by Attorney X working on
Attorney Y's litigation team, and vice versa. The risk thus is spread by
this reciprocal work sharing. But if the fee award is challenged (as in
Fine Paper and other recent cases), it may be difficult for Attorney X to
justify his hours on Attorney Y's case with the thoroughness that recent
decisions interpreting the lodestar formula have begun to demand. In
reality, the two attorneys have worked out a fee-splitting arrangement
which is implemented through reciprocal work sharing, and neither ex-
pected much active participation from the other. Thus, the feasibility
of these arrangements is inhibited by both the procedural rigor with
which courts are now enforcing the lodestar formula and the likelihood
of outside challenges to the fee award. If, however, we reverted to a
percentage-of-the-recovery formula, there would be no need for the
court to look over the shoulders of the plaintiffs, and outside challenges
could be directed only to the aggregate level of the fees, not their inter-
nal allocation. In substance, the plaintiffs' bar would be free to split the
pie as they saw fit and thus could more closely approximate efficient
diversification.
pattern of the same firms sharing steering committee leadership. Prior to the explosion in
Fine Paper, Kohn and the "Chicago Group" had frequently cooperated on such a basis. See
Bruck, supra note 17. A close working relationship also was evident in Fine Paper between
Kohn and David Berger, another eminent Philadelphia plaintiffs' lawyer, to whom Kohn
sought to direct work even though Berger had no client in the action. See Weil, Gotshal
Report at 24.
152. There are three obvious routes toward diversification: (1) plaintiffs' lawyers can
band together in firms, in which event neither the lodestar formula nor existing disciplinary
rules pose any obstacle to intra-firm fee sharing, (2) they can enter into fee allocation agree-
ments under which the fees will be shared according to a defined percentage regardless of
how the court awards them (this is the fact pattern in Lewis P. Teleprompter), or (3) they can
engage in reciprocal work-sharing arrangements. The latter two options are impeded to the
extent that the court insists on allocating the fees and closely scrutinizes the time records.
The former approach might then seem the logical one, but plaintiffs' firms have historically
proven themselves to be unstable, either because of the clash of strong egos, the lack of




In this light, patronage battles and the free rider problem are not
the only reasons for the seemingly excessive number of plaintiffs who
intervene in cases such as Fine Paper. An additional reason may be
this need of the professional plaintiffs' attorney to spread his risks by
diversification. But this goal is in no way inconsistent with the logic of
the private attorney general; rather, it reduces the prospect of cheap
settlements caused by the plaintiff attorney's inability to wage a pro-
tracted fight or to accept the risk of defeat. Denying the private attor-
ney general the ability to limit his risk helps no one except the
defendant.
To sum up, judicial recognition of the need for the plaintiffs in
major class litigation to be organized as an economic firm, rather than
as a political coalition, would entail several desirable results: (1) the
true "free rider" would be quickly eliminated, (2) the court would be
saved the time now wasted in resolving the inevitable disputes among
contending plaintiffs' counsel and allocating the attorneys' fee among
the horde of claimants, and (3) those running the case could reduce
their exposure to risk by diversification based on reciprocal work as-
signment arrangements. In contrast, the contemporary lodestar system
of close judicial oversight amounts to a heavy-handed form of regula-
tion which is increasingly inconsistent with our society's preference for
less paternalism and more reliance on market incentives.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the private attorney general, this is the winter of his discon-
tent. Everyone - courts, commentators, and academics (including this
author) - has a critical view of the private attorney general's current
performance. But how do we improve his performance? To rescue the
private attorney general, this article has suggested that we must save
him from both his myopic admirers and his eagle-eyed enemies. It
must be recognized that the bounty hunter does not perform well when
certain conditions exist. Stated baldly, these are:
(1) When the bounty hunter can negotiate with his prey, the de-
fendant may outbid the bounty offered by the state. This is essentially
the problem that the lodestar formula and non-pecuniary settlements
aggravate, although it persists in a less dramatic form so long as the
adversaries have some power to trade low recoveries for high fees.
(2) If the entrepreneurial attorney cannot obtain something resem-
bling a property right in the action, he will not invest time and effort,
but instead will tag along in the wake of governmental enforcement
pursuing the pot of gold that such actions ultimately bestow on some-
one. Even in these piggyback private actions, the incentive to the pri-
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vate attorney general is still diluted by the intervention of a horde of
superfluous attorneys. Thus, the sad irony is that we have successful
private enforcement only when we need it least - namely, in those
cases where the plaintiffs attorney has merely "to shoot the fish in the
barrel" because of a prior action by public enforcers.
(3) To the extent that the private attorney general must defer pay-
ment and gamble on the outcome of the big case, he predictably will be
risk adverse and in consequence will accept inadequate settlements.
In response to these structural limitations, one can condemn collu-
sive settlements in moralistic terms or hope for more idealistic lawyers
to take up the cudgels. But such efforts will accomplish little. What is
necessary is a redesigned structure under which the principal plaintiff's
attorney (1) must not negotiate his fee with the defendant, (2) need not
negotiate with other plaintiffs' attorneys, (3) but may engage in recipro-
cal work sharing agreements with other attorneys. At least within the
context of "entrepreneurial" litigation, a return to a percentage-of-the-
recovery formula might be the simplest means to this end, but it is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition in itself. Because the per-
centage would always be somewhat flexible to reflect a variety of fac-
tors, the possibility of collusion would remain as the defendant could
still offer a higher percentage for an inadequate settlement. Alterna-
tively, to the extent that a lodestar formula is retained, a prohibition on
contemporaneous fee and settlement discussions, if coupled with some
incentive to the plaintiff not to delay, and a ceiling phrased in terms of
a maximum percentage of the recovery, may provide a satisfactory so-
lution. Neither, however, will be effective unless the organization of
the action is rationalized through rules that prevent political battles
over the control of the cases. Even a "first-come, first-served" rule of
priority is preferable to the current chaos.
Counter-intuitive conclusions also follow from this perspective
which focuses on the incentives to the plaintiff's attorney. Generally,
proponents of the private attorney general have advocated fee shifting
whereby the losing defendant bears the plaintiffs' legal expenses. But
so long as some implicit negotiation of the fee award is possible among
the adversaries, fee shifting exacerbates the danger of collusion, and a
"common fund" rationale for the fee award is therefore in this respect
preferable. Moreover, fee shifting means that the defendant would not
know his maximum liability if a prophylactic rule were adopted bar-
ring fee discussions during the settlement process. Because a prophy-
lactic rule seems desirable, and only feasible if the "common fund" is
taxed for the recovery, the case for fee shifting under the old "private
attorney general" exception to the American rule is thereby weakened.
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The recent critics of the lodestar formula have focused on the in-
centive it creates to be dilatory. True as this criticism is, it is a problem
of secondary significance. The more important immediate deficiencies
of the lodestar formula are two-fold: (1) it permits the plaintiff to assure
himself of a fee with relative confidence even though his services have
not rendered a substantial benefit to the class, and (2) it is at least
mildly corrupting to the ethics of the system that all parties, including
the court, are conspiring to permit this to occur. Arguably, the legal
system can no more be a little bit corrupt than it can be a little bit
pregnant.
Over the long run, the lodestar formula's vulnerability to abuse is
its most serious weakness because it discredits the private attorney gen-
eral as a concept. This vulnerability permits defendants to wage a con-
tinuing attack on the desirability of private enforcement. Fine Paper
appears to have been only the first round in this warfare, and similar
attacks on the integrity of the plaintiffs' bar have now been made in
other much-publicized antitrust cases.' 5 3 Although no one -including
the self-appointed private attorney general - should be beyond critical
scrutiny, the result is that the plaintiffs' attorney now must anticipate a
two-front war before he can be compensated. First, he must win a sub-
stantive victory (either on the merits or by settlement) and then he must
prove that he is not a crook when putative representatives of the plain-
tiffs' class, consisting of Fortune 500 corporations, seek to challenge his
fee petition as inflated. Once again, the result is to chill his incentive.
Thus, structural reform, such as some form of a percentage-of-the-re-
covery formula, is preferable.
Ultimately, the academic reformer has a duty to specify not only
what the optimal solution is, but what the first tentative steps are that
should be taken toward it. This author would recommend the follow-
ing immediate reforms:
(1) Most clearly, the Manualfor Complex Litigation should be re-
vised so as to reverse its current position'54 and make the selection of
lead counsel a judicial responsibility, rather than the subject of a polit-
ical election. In addition, enhanced authority should be given lead
153. A challenge similar to that made by Weil, Gotshal's clients in Fine Paper has been
made with respect to the requested attorneys' fees in Corrugated Container; again, the objec-
tors are Fortune 500 corporations claiming that their share of the recovery is being dissi-
pated through excessive attorneys' fees. See Mieher, supra note 19. (General Motors,
Beatrice Foods Co., Esmark Inc., and 24 other corporations have hired counsel to challenge
the fees). A related challenge was also made in Armored Car by the Atlantic Richfield
Company and the Penn Central National Bank. See In re Armored Car Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 472 F. Supp. at 1381 n.20.
154. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92 (5th ed. 1981).
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counsel to control work assignments (and, if need be, to retain the serv-
ices of additional attorneys not otherwise participating in the action).
(2) The lodestar formula should be substantially modified. This
modification could be implemented through recommended guidelines
set forth in the Manual specifying the maximum fee award (as a per-
centage of the settlement fund) that should be permitted under the
lodestar formula. In particular, these guidelines should require the
court to attempt to estimate the value of nonpecuniary relief and add
the estimated value to the settlement fund before applying the percent-
age ceiling to limit the fee award justified on a time formula basis. This
combination of a percentage-of-the-recovery formula as a ceiling and a
time formula as a minimal requirement best avoids the deficiencies of
either formula standing alone.I-'
(3) When the private action follows a prior governmental pro-
ceeding, a substantially lower percentage ceiling on the fee award
should apply and contingency bonuses seldom would be appropriate.
Distinctions, of course, would need to be drawn between actions that
follow a judgment in favor of the government versus those that follow
only the filing of the complaint.
(4) The danger of contemporaneous settlement and fee award ne-
gotiations should be highlighted, and, in those areas where fee shifting
is not authorized by statute, it should be prohibited. Although this is
best done as a matter of legal ethics, local court rules also could pro-
hibit such discussions.
(5) When nonpecuniary relief constitutes the greater portion of
the relief obtained, the Manual should advise both trial and appellate
courts to exercise substantial skepticism in reviewing the adequacy of
such settlements. In addition, intervenors should be given the fullest
opportunity to show that they could obtain a better settlement.
These reforms could be implemented without legislation. Legisla-
tion, however, may be desirable in the antitrust field to revise the dam-
age formula in the piggyback action. 5
6
155. See supra text and accompanying note 122.
156. My proposal would be that only compensatory damages go to the plaintiff in such
cases, with the remaining two thirds going to a crime victims' compensation fund. This
keeps the penalty high for purposes of general deterrence but reduces the settlement fund to
the class on which the fee award would be based under either a percentage-of-the-recovery
formula or modified lodestar formula; thus, it assures a higher fee for a plaintiff-initiated
case than for a "tag-along" action. See Coffee, 'Wo Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick" An
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386,
434-40 (1981). If the plaintiff were still given treble damages but the fee award were based
only on compensatory damages, the incentive structure would still be socially undesirable
because it would remain possible for the client and his attorney to negotiate a contingent fee
agreement so that the expected return from a piggyback action would remain high in pro-
19831
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Given the above reforms, what expectations can we reasonably
have of the private attorney general as a mechanism of accountability?
This is a broad question, and it is not this article's contention that the
reforms here proposed will produce a panacea. Still other problems
confound private enforcement of the law: Economies of scale may
sometimes make the state the superior body for enforcing a particular
statute or right; at other times, the need for prosecutorial discretion
may actually make it desirable that private enforcers only follow in the
wake of an initial action brought by a public agency. These issues are
beyond the scope of this initial attempt at understanding what has gone
wrong. This much, however, can be said with relative confidence: a
mature legal system must recognize that the private attorney general is
an entrepreneur who should be compensated and regulated accord-
ingly. If it persists in the pretense that he is simply a lawyer represent-
ing a client, the Fine Paper debacle will be repeated again and again,
and Dickens' Jarndyce v. Jarndyce will be read not as parody, but as
documentary.
portion to that associated with actions truly initiated by the private enforcer. Thus, award-
ing only compensatory damages to the plaintiff decreases the expected return for piggyback
actions, while still maintaining a high penalty structure.
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